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# IMPACTS OF PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES ON AFFINITY TOWARDS RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AMONG EMPLOYEES IN AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

A longitudinal analysis based on the identical blocks of the  
SIREN and SOCRIS questionnaires.

A survey report.



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Impacts of perceptions of socio-economic changes on affinity towards right-wing extremism among employees in Austria and Hungary

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A survey report.

Editor:

*GRAJ CZJÁR István, PhD*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis of 2008 has severely affected citizens all over Europe, leading to high levels of insecurity and declining trust in public institutions. Parallel, in the past ten years, populist parties, namely those on the radical right, have enjoyed considerable success across Europe. This success has attracted the attention of an increasing number of scholars and political commentators from a wide variety of disciplines. As recent European and national elections showed they are indeed becoming even more attractive to a significant part of the electorate. But do reactions to the consequences of the crisis and to experiences of deprivation really necessarily lead to more authoritarianism, ethno-nationalism and xenophobia and, through these to affinity to right wing populism and extremism? We try to answer this question in this paper comparing two countries hit very differently by the socio-economic crisis that began in 2008, but showed similar tendencies concerning right-wing radicalization since then: Austria and Hungary. Both of the chosen countries took part both in the SIREN<sup>1</sup> and the ongoing SOCRIS<sup>2</sup> projects, which – inter alia – investigated the link between the perceptions of socio-economic changes and political orientations of employees: the SIREN survey was conducted in 2003, while the SOCRIS in 2017. Only employees who have been active for at least 5 years on the labour market (N=2800; 1400 in each country) belonged to the investigated population, and so, they could have enough experiences concerning socio-economic changes in the world of work, more precisely, in their workplaces.

So, this analysis will map the perceptions of, and reactions to, the socio-economic changes and will link these to political orientations of employees in Austria and Hungary over time. In doing so, it will explore the impact of the crisis on social cohesion and anti-democratic developments. The paper will show to what extent these developments have fuelled exclusivist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes and increased the attraction to the populist radical right. The following investigation will analyse individual reactions to the crisis as being influenced by people's particular employment and working conditions, their class positions and the value judgments and political orientations these may imply, by the protection or exposure people experience depending on their social status as well as by shifting feelings of belonging.

Research questions are as follows:

- How do people perceive changes in their working and living conditions over time?
- What different attitudes and political orientations do people develop or strengthen in dealing with the consequences of the crisis?
- How do such changes and their perceptions impact on political orientations before and after the crisis?
- To what extent, where and relating to which groups of employees can the changes make people receptive to right-wing populism and extremism and, in particular, to xenophobia, nationalism and racism in the different rounds?
- What changes can be observed concerning attitudinal and political reactions of employees to socio-economic changes and crises between countries and survey rounds?
- What are the differences and similarities between Austria and Hungary, and how can these be explained?

*1.A. The structure of the paper*

First, we analyse most important socio-economic and political changes in Austria and Hungary in the last decades. Then, in the theoretical part, we present the most relevant findings of scientific literature concerning the link between socio-economic changes and crises and the rise of right wing extremism, moreover the far-right wing parties in Austria and Hungary. Next, a short description of methodology used for this paper is presented and we add the conceptual framework and operationalization of aggregated variables for employed sampling. Adverting to the first part of the analysis we demonstrate how socio-demographic and social status variables influenced perceptions of socio-economic changes, moreover, how these took effects on social attachment, feelings of appreciation/deprivation, subjective wellbeing, right wing political/receptiveness attitudes, and RWE party affinity in Hungary and Austria, separately, based on simple and step by step multiple linear regression analyses.

Finally, in the third part, we present our path models and in the last part we draw up our conclusions.

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<sup>1</sup> The SIREN project (Socio-Economic Change, Individual Reactions and the Appeal of the Extreme Right) investigated links between socio-economic changes on the labour market caused by neoliberal politics and the affinity to right wing radicalism in eight European countries including Austria and Hungary between 2001 and 2004. The project was funded by the European Commission and co-funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> see more detailed: <https://www.socris-project.com>, founded by National Research, Development and Innovation Office – NKFIH (ANN 120360) and FWF.

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## 2. *THE IMPACT OF CRISES ON THE HUNGARIAN AND AUSTRIAN LABOUR MARKET – SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES (SEC)*<sup>3</sup>

### 2.A. *The crisis of 2008 and its effects on wages and consumptions of the households in Hungary and Austria*

**Hungary** was affected by both waves of the global economic and financial crisis breaking out in 2008 more deeply than the majority of the EU member states. Economic downturn started in Hungary already before the crisis, and it was on a larger scale than in the neighbouring countries. In the second quarter of 2009, domestic real (i.e. adjusted for inflation) volume of GDP fell by 6.7% compared to the same period of the previous year in Hungary, which exceeds the average 4.4% decrease of the EU28 countries. According to the Hungarian Labour Market Review of 2016, the crisis of 2008/2009 afflicted the domestic import, export, and industrial production more heavily than the GDP decrease. The crisis broke the cyclic change of these macro-economic indicators that reached its deepest point at the time of the crisis. The first wave of the crisis meant the absolute deepest point, but its second wave resulted in a significant decay as well (Blaskó et al. 2016). In the second wave of the crisis, productivity figures fell again to a larger extent as compared to the EU28 average, but then this tendency turned back, and since 2013 the growth of the real volume of GDP in Hungary is over the average real GDP growth of the EU28 countries (Eurostat 2016b).

The European Commission report on Hungary of 2016 designated the increase of export and private consumption as the reason for GDP growth. According to the report, the growth of 2015 is due to the decrease of public debt and deficit<sup>4</sup>, more favourable labour market environment, and public employment. But, Hungary's growth potential falls behind that of the neighbouring countries. Researchers found that the reason for the gap opening is the low level of productivity and innovation, the insecurities of the business sector, and the sectorial supertaxes (European Commission 2016; Blaskó et al. 2016, p. 12; Oblath 2014, p. 2; Medgyesi 2016). According to the 2015/2016 Global Competitiveness Index Hungary is 63<sup>rd</sup> while for example Austria is the 23<sup>rd</sup> in the list of the world's 140 countries (World Economic Forum 2016). The comparison of the places of the two countries demonstrates Hungary's falling behind the developed member states of the European Union.<sup>5</sup>

The change of GDP calculated on Purchasing Power Parity in USD per capita can provide an image of how economic productivity affects the consumption of the members of the society. The GDP PPP – after all the indicator of the growing standard of living – was constantly increasing between 1996 and 2006. At the beginning of the 2000s, household consumption data in Hungary were 58% of the EU15 countries, and 57% twelve years later (Simonovits–Szivós

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<sup>3</sup> This chapter is based on summarizing of the following manuscripts: Julia Hofmann - Ulrike Papouschek - Saskja Schindler - Annika Schönauer (2017): National Report Austria and István Grajczjar - Antal Örkény - Zsuzsanna Ádám - Sonam Kotadia - Zsófia Nagy (2017): National Report Hungary

<sup>4</sup> The government's austerity measures aiming at reducing the deficit made an effect even before the crisis. As a result, the decrease of real incomes, and the increase of the unemployment rate already started well before 2009. Real income reached its bottom before the start of the crisis (2006/2007), and in the second wave of the crisis, and only started to grow again in 2013 (Medgyesi 2016).

<sup>5</sup> See the website of the World Economic Forum for more details on the placing of the countries: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/country-highlights/>.

2016). The crisis especially affected the households of larger number with an inactive head. The coping strategy of the Hungarian population was ranging from using up the savings through selling assets to taking loans. Research data showed that every third household was obliged to hold back their expenses on fashion and electronic goods. Another 25% was forced to save on basic foods, 20% on consumer goods (Simonovits and Szivós 2016). During the recession, borrowing took the form of informal loans in increasing numbers (Medgyesi 2016).

While the consumption level of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia grew by nearly four-fifth, in the past 11 years, the consumption level of the households in Hungary increased by slightly more than a quarter (28%). This more or less equals the average growth (26%) of “old” EU member states (Simonovits and Szivós 2016). The consumption level in Hungary could only be exceeded its highest rate before the second wave of the crisis after 2013 (Scharle 2016).

At the millennium the net savings of the households were scarce owing to the population’s indebtedness, and the mortgages of state support. This was then (right before the crisis) complemented by the increase in the number of foreign currency loans. After the start of the crisis, fewer loans were taken, which positively influenced the household savings that grew already in 2011. Researchers found in the background of the decrease in the number of loans both reasons of supply and demand: resource depletion, the fast deterioration of credit portfolio on one side, high and constantly increasing instalments, unemployment and increasing insecurity as a result, and a decrease in consumption due to all the above on the other side. Measures to help people having taken foreign currency loans, like transforming existing foreign currency loans into HUF based ones, or the opportunity of early repayment at a reduced rate (Medgyesi 2016). Fewer loans were accompanied by a lower number of people struggling with arrears, and the accumulation of financial assets (of households). Due to the decrease of the loan balance, by 2014 household savings exceeded the level of the pre-crisis period, and they were growing in the period after the crisis (Medgyesi 2016).

**Austria** was already hit by the economic crisis in the second half of 2008, but the serious shrinking of the economy began in 2009 as the GDP fell by 3.6 per cent annually (Scheiblecker et al. 2010). However, Austria’s economic setback was far not so bad and so long than that of the most European countries, and the situation was even better than in Germany (ibid. 234).

The crisis hit (besides the financial sector of course) initially the export sector in Austria, whereby total exports narrowed by 20 per cent in 2009. Particularly, manufacturing sector suffered by fall-back (e.g. producers of investment and durable consumption goods). The decline in orders reached 40-50 per cent by some manufacturers (Hermann-Flecker 2012). All in all, value added diminished by 11.7 per cent in 2009 (Scheiblecker et al. 2010).

However, the Austrian GDP started to grow by 2 per cent in 2010 again (Hermann-Flecker 2012). This is mainly due to the recovery of export industry, but the growth of the industrial sector (6.7 per cent in 2010) had also made an important contribution after declining by 14.3 per cent in 2009 (Hermann-Flecker 2012). But employment in the production sector continued to decline in 2010: companies hired rather agency workers than additional permanent staff



(Scheiblecker et al. 2011). After this stagnation period, investment in production has started to grow again in 2011.

Austria has followed the German neo-mercantilist policy concerning wages for years. Consequently, real wages lagged behind productivity levels which contributed deflation and an export boom before the crisis. Therefore, Austria was able to survive the crisis relative easily, what is more, real wages grew by 2,9 per cent in 2009 (the main reason for the boost in real wages was the further decline in inflation, however), more than in Sweden or Germany (Hermann-Flecker 2012). The year of 2009 was the only one when Austria has not violated (from below) the inflation goal of the ECB and wages exceeded productivity (Hermann-Flecker 2012). This and tax cuts (some 2.1 per cent of the GDP), however, compensated the huge setback in exports and showed signs of return to Keynesian deficit-spending. Unfortunately, tax cuts for households benefited mainly high earners (mostly those belong to the tenth decile, while this policy did not help for people in the first four deciles).

Accordingly, the deficit grew by 3,7 percent between 2008 and 2010 and the total deficit reached 72,3 per cent in 2011. So, the government decided to introduce austerity packages in two waves (Hermann-Flecker 2012). The major contributions came from consumer taxes which had hit lower income households again. Low income households also suffered from cuts in welfare spending, including cuts in care benefits and family allowances. “*So, the stimulus was followed by an austerity package adopted in 2011 had a clearly negative impact on household consumption*” (Hermann-Flecker 2012).

Despite all of these, Austria has weathered the crisis relatively well (the recession was deep but short), clearly easier than Hungary, because of:

- the neo-mercantilist policies and the export surplus before the crisis (at expenses of foreign countries),
- quick recovery of demand for exports,
- in spite all of these, quick adoption of Keynesian policies against mainstream neoliberal policies when needed,
- two important economic stimuli and two labour market packages, promoting demand-led growth and subsidizing the preservation of employment,
- real wage increases and short-time working reform and adopting short-time working on the company level systematically negotiated by social partners which helped to a revival of Austrian social partnership (Hermann-Flecker 2012).

## ***2.B. Labour Market and Employment Security in Hungary and Austria***

Since the millennium **Hungarian** economy and labour market have been characterized by instability which made the economic boom and catching up with the developed European economies difficult. According to the Hungarian Labour Market Review of 2015, the employment rate of people of active age fell in the period of the crisis, then started to grow dynamically after the lowest point in 2013, reaching an average of 4 million 210 thousand employees in the Hungarian labour market by 2015. This is the highest rate ever measured, and its reason is the growing the number of people working in the primary labour market and in the public employment programme, and the increasing number of workers abroad. In public

employment, 212 thousand people were permanently employed according to the data of the Central Statistical Office, and 348 thousand people were employed at least for one day. Statistics show that public employment – as active labour market tool – reduced unemployment and increased employment; however, it did not help the reintegration into the primary labour market. This can especially be harmful for people living in poverty whose chances of breaking out are potentially reduced by public employment (Blaskó et al. 2016). There are several factors related to public employment that may distort the employment figures. Although public employment itself aims at the (re)integration of the permanently unemployed into the primary labour market, it contributes to the employment statistics (in accordance with EUROSTAT recommendations). It is worth mentioning in relation to glossing over statistical data that if the remuneration for the public employment was defined as aid, people doing public work would appear in the unemployment statistics. There is also the fact in the background of the improving indicators of public employment that the government managed to reduce periodicity by offering jobs to do at wintertime, and training opportunities, i.e., it was able to avoid lower employment rates in the winter period (Scharle 2016).

It is worth to note that behind the gradual improvement of the figures related to employment, consumption, living, and poverty are the changes of the data sample and methodology in the meanwhile, besides the public employment and its calculation, and the growing proportion of people employed abroad mentioned earlier. The modification of calculating the consumer baskets and subsistence level (and through this, poverty) is due to several factors; like the usage of the OECD2 equivalence scales (giving one unit to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to further adults, and 0.3 to children), and the reduction of per capita food norm for adults to the basal metabolic rate (from 2400 to 1800 kcal) (see Scharle 2016, p. 54; Havasi 2016a; Havasi 2016b for more details). Furthermore, according to related literature, employment figures were influenced by policy measures rather than by demographic data. Such measures include raising the retirement age, and lowering the age of compulsory education to 16 years (Blaskó et al. 2016). As far as labour emigration is concerned, the number of Hungarian employees in the most popular target countries (Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom) tripled in the past 15 years (Blaskó et al. 2016, p. 20, 23).

The common feature of the period before and after the crisis is the growth of aggregated employment without a significant improvement of the employment opportunities of people in their best age for employment. It is premonitory since the reserves lying in the practice of retirement and disablement are about to be exhausted, and the present government's vocational training and higher education policy threatens with reducing the rate of marketable workforce (Eppich and Köllő 2014).

In **Austria**, the increase of unemployment is a remarkable development in the labor market (Knittler and Stadler 2012), appearing markedly in terms of youth and long-term unemployment (Tamesberger 2016). Moreover, statistics show that alterations in the labor market composition tend to increase atypical employment (Knittler and Stadler 2012).

During the pinnacle of the first wave of the economic crisis, a significant increase in unemployment was hampered by short-term work, the reduction of overtime and vacation

together with educational leaves. At the same time the number of temporary agency workers has decreased dramatically (Stichtagserhebung 2012; Schlager, 2013). However, statistical figures show that in Austria, unemployment has been on the rise since 2009 (with a short period of recovery between 2010 and 2011). Compared to 4,1 per cent in 2008, the ratio of unemployed was 5,9 per cent in 2016. In fact, over 400 thousand people (422,262 in January 2017) were unemployed in Austria (AMS 2017). In absolute numbers this change represents an almost 50 per cent increase since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 (AMS 2008), which is a clear “record” for post-war Austria.

High unemployment rates particularly affect low-skilled workers, non-nationals and the younger generations. Between 2008 and 2016 youth unemployment rose from 8.5 per cent to 11.1 per cent, concentrating especially among low-skilled workers (under apprenticeship level). On a national level, their unemployment rate reaches 25 per cent, in cities, such as Vienna, this ratio is 40 per cent. Altogether, low-skilled people account for 45 per cent of all unemployed (AMS 2017). Non-national workers amount for 16 per cent of the workforce in Austria, among low-skilled employees their share is 25 per cent, many of them encountering dis-qualification processes. As a consequence, their unemployment rates above the Austrian average. Since 2008, absolute numbers of their unemployment figures have grown by more than 100 per cent (AMS 2017).

However, the length of unemployment is growing, especially among the elderly (Leidl-Krapfenbauer 2016). Tamesberger argues that the negative consequences of longer-term unemployment, such as stigma, demotivation etc. also affect people unemployed for less than a year, therefore the definition of long-term unemployed should be extended to include those unemployed over six months. Within this expanded definition, the figures of long-term unemployed have increased fourfold between 2008 (the year before the crisis affected the Austrian labour market) and 2015 (Tamesberger 2016).

Between 2008 and 2015, a sharp decline in Austrian standard employment is also apparent (-72,500; -2.9%) (Knittler 2016). In contrast, atypical employment has increased (Knittler 2016). Most of this growth consists only of part-time employment (+166,000, mainly women) (Knittler 2016, 416). Part-time work provides the same level of protection, but a lower level of access to social security than full-time employment, positioning it somewhere between standard and atypical employment. However, other atypical forms of employment (such as temporary work or fixed-term employment) have increased while full-time employment has declined. Therefore, we can identify a slight change in the composition of the Austrian labor market, with a tendency for less protected employment to grow.

Two tendencies can be observed in the segmentation of the labor market: First, the gender segmentation is clearly deepening. While the majority of men still work full-time, close to half of the female workers work part-time (Knittler 2016). Secondly, as we have already mentioned, the tendency to increase the number of less protected jobs and the reduction of full-time employment is apparent (Knittler and Stadler 2012).

While less observable from the statistics, a third trend needs to be mentioned: growing unemployment, competition between core and peripheral staff and the discipline effects of increasing precariat (see i.e. Holst et al. 2009) put significant pressure on legally well-protected

standard employment in the last two decades, together with outsourcing and location shiftings (Flecker 2012). Therefore, growing flexibility has led to the first segment continuously losing perceived security, and accepting wage cuts. It is quite likely that this process has gained momentum during the crisis. So the first segment has changed its character to a certain extent and got closer to the second segment.

### ***2.C. Social inequalities and poverty during and following the crisis in Hungary and Austria***

To judge the role of the welfare state and the changes of the social services, the development of the income distribution and social inequalities needs to be reviewed first, and then will the extent of poverty and the change of the welfare redistribution in **Hungary** be examined.

The number of households with no active earners was growing even before the crisis (Szivós and Tóth 2008). Regarding the effects of the crisis on employment, it reduced the number of people living in households with economically active members in a way that households with two wage-earners were affected badly (Tóth 2010). Therefore, it is important concerning the distribution of income that although the situation of both the rich and the poor got worse during the crisis, but that of the poor became worse (Tóth 2010). Interestingly, the Gini coefficient was the highest in 2005 (34.7), while the lowest in 2009 (27) before and during the crisis in Hungary. Some 30.4 point (very similar to the Austrian data) was calculated in 2015, however.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of the crisis, a significant reorganisation seems to have taken place concerning the relative income situation:

- among the aged, and people with children – the elderly increasingly got into the middle income categories, and people having children were forced into the bottom of the income distribution;
- among people with different numbers of children – people without children got more into the upper income groups, while people with (and especially ones with many) children got into the lower ones;
- among people of different level of education – the university degree became associated with higher income categories, while lower education level with impoverishment more and more;
- inactive people outside of the labour market and the unemployed are concentrated more in the growing number of the group of poor; and, finally,
- the proportion of the gypsies has also grown significantly among the poorest group (Tóth 2010).

However, income distribution is only one indicator of material deprivation. Townsend (1979) defined deprivation as “the disability to live at a normal standard”, and envisaged a poverty line that is independent of the distribution of income. Sen (1989) also emphasizes the importance of the adequacy of income instead of the lack of income.

As far as income poverty is concerned, Hungary is below the EU average. According to Eurostat 2015 data, 14.6% of the Hungarian population was living in relative income poverty, which

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<sup>6</sup> own calculation: see world bank homepage  
[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2015&locations=HUAT&name\\_desc=false&start=2000&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2015&locations=HUAT&name_desc=false&start=2000&view=chart)

means that the poverty level of Hungary is similar to that of Austria, Cyprus, Slovenia, or Sweden (Eurostat 2016a). At the same time, the extent of income poverty and deprivation can lead to very different statistical results depending on what is taken into consideration when examining living conditions, and these various data are prone to the different interests and ways of talking. The proportion of people living in material deprivation in Hungary is the third highest in the European Union after Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2015 it reached the 44% of the population. Similar data are found in TÁRKI's Social Report 2016: in 2009 about half of the population of Hungary (53%) lived deprived of basic material goods, and a third lived in severe material deprivation, and this rate was reduced to 37% and 23% by 2015 (Gábos et al. 2016).

Concerning the probability of material deprivation, within households of very low work intensity a significant and strong relationship is detected between the occurrence of material deprivation and the education level of the head of the household. In 2015, the rate of deprivation is especially high in the case of households with a head of Roma origin (its probability is 64% as opposed to 21% in the case of the non-Roma population). Differences are significant by place of residence: the frequency of deprivation is a lot lower among people living in the more developed Western regions, in large cities, and Budapest than among the population of disadvantaged regions and small municipalities. The proportion of deprived people is also higher in households with more than four members (40%), among those living in one-person households (29-31%), and single parents (34%). The lack of holidays, the inability to cover unexpected expenses (practically 100%), and inadequate meat consumption is typical of the majority of both deprived and gravely deprived people, and most of the heavily deprived cannot even heat their houses properly (Gábos et al 2016).

With regard to the distribution of income in **Austria**, Guger and Marterbauer (2005, S. 619f., Feigl et al., 2012, p. 358) report a constantly increasing income inequality between 1976 and 2003. The functional income distribution shows a significant decrease in the wage ratio in the same period.

The Gini coefficient shows a slow but steady increase in the income inequality of Austrian households over the past two decades: it increased from 23.8 to 25.2 between 1993 and 1999, and continued to rise from 28.7 to 31.5 between 2004 and 2009. Poorest segments of the Austrian society were losing ground especially in the 1990s, from the 2000s onwards they were joined by the middle classes: the income share of the poorest 20 per cent decreased by 47 per cent between 1990 and 2011. Paralelly, the income share of the top 20 per cent grew by 8 per cent. The income share of the top 1 per cent increased by 16 per cent at the same time (Atzmüller and Hofmann 2016). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the figures are relatively moderate, as income inequality statistics tend to obscure significant inequalities between different social groups and strata (gender inequalities, inequalities between migrants and nationals). Taking these differences into account, we find a rather segmented and increasingly polarized social structure in Austria (Atzmüller and Hofmann 2016).

According to Feigl and colleagues (2012) there exists a twofold link connecting social inequality to income distribution and to the current economic / multiple crisis: First, the growing

social inequality generally contributes to the emergence of economic crises. Growing social inequality leads to decreasing demand and therefore, economic instability. Secondly, economic crises, on the other hand, have a significant impact on income distribution and social inequality. In the short-term social inequality diminishes, as profits are falling sharply, while wages decline with delay because of decline in employment. However, in the medium term, the growth of unemployment weakens the bargaining power of the workforce and, as a result, leads to worsening social inequality due to moderate wage increases. In this manner, Austrian figures show an increased wage ratio in 2009, first in the last 20 years, although unemployment has risen significantly (Leoni et al. 2011, S. 210; Feigl et al., 2012, S. 363), while 2010 and 2011 can be characterized by a decrease (Mayrhuber et al. 2015).

The "Austrian model's" relative success is closely linked to the country's economic situation in the European Union and its severe economic imbalances, which have contributed to the crisis since 2008, in terms of labor market performance, social inequality structures and poverty rates. Austria, like Germany, is one of the most export-oriented countries in the EU. However, the viability of an export-oriented strategy predominantly relies on the relatively subdued development of wages and labor costs, which are being negotiated under the Austrian social partnership system, particularly in comparison with European countries. In Austria, as in Germany, wage moderation to encourage exports led to a significant decline in the wage ratio within the GDP (from 15% to 20%, and the net wage ratio of GDP below 60% since the early 1990s). Wage growth and productivity ratios have become more unequal in recent decades: Therefore, since 1980, labor productivity has risen much faster than real wages (Atzmüller and Hofmann 2016).

#### ***2.D. Social policy in Hungary and Austria***

One way of employment and income distribution is the regulation of the minimum wage by the government. **Hungary** has always had a high proportion of people employed for the minimum wage, and even this was gradually and significantly growing following the crisis. However, raising the minimum wage has its risks. Firstly, it may increase unemployment, as employers are forced to dismiss employees in order to reduce their loss; secondly, it may increase illegal employment; thirdly, it may increase the number of people that employers will only employ at the minimum wage; and fourthly, it may worsen the differentiation of the wages by distorting the income rates upwards, and squeezing the wage structure of the businesses more and more. This way government intervention prevents free market competition, the efficiency of businesses, and the advantages of social policy are questionable (Szivós 2012).

The other important labour market related development was the introduction of public employment. Government communication argued that creating full employment is essential for both macroeconomic and social political reasons, and it can only be reached by directing the population living on social aids and benefits into the world of work. Not only reaching full employment was a doubtful and disputable goal of this argument, but how public employment can guide back and integrate public workers into the market-based labour market on the long run is highly questionable. Public employment is a special form of employment status; unemployed people leave the registry for the period of public employment. Following the termination of the public employment, slightly more than 10% of the participants enter the

primary labour market, and this rate has gradually been shrinking since 2011 (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár 2014). Public work is “compulsory”; rejecting it may result in losing the social aids at once and for up to a three-year period, at the same time, the monthly salary to earn by public employment does not reach 200 Euros, therefore the gap between public work wages and minimum market wages threatens with job losses on the market. Last but not least, public employment combined with social aids does not provide the great majority of people affected for breaking out of poverty (Eppich and Köllő 2014).

In the area of taxation the most important change after the crisis was the introduction of the flat rate income tax by the Fidesz government. And, although government communication keeps emphasizing its positive effects (and the constant decrease in the rate of the single tax), in reality it significantly increased the inequalities, for many reasons, such as:

- the Flat Tax and its constantly reducing rate primarily favours people with high income, and belonging to the upper middle and upper classes;
- the Flat Tax is definitely disadvantageous for families with a low income, not to speak about those living exclusively from welfare redistribution (e.g. unemployed, and public workers);
- as state revenues cannot decrease, consumer taxes are the highest in Europe (VAT), and its burdens are particularly suffered by poor families, since these expenditures represent an extremely high part of their total household expenditures (Markó 2012).

Further tax reductions and various state support significantly contribute to the increase of inequalities; including the income tax reduction for families with two or three children, which is not advantageous at all for families of low or no income. State funding to support building or buying apartments (like the CSOK introduced in 2016) also mainly favours well-to-do families since they require a substantial amount of own funding that poorer families lack.<sup>7</sup>

All these state tax policy measures are basically in favour of richer and more successful households with a higher income, strengthen families of upper and upper middle status, enhancing this way social polarisation already mentioned earlier.

The state spends slightly more than one fifth of the GDP on social expenditures. This more or less equals the OECD average but lower than the expenditures of western welfare states. Between 2009 and 2012, Hungary did a radical, 3 percent reduction in the area, unprecedented in the West. In Austria for example, the reduction of social expenditures was only 1 percent in the same period (Felméry 2015).

The largest and fastest growing part, three-fourths of social expenditures is retirement benefits. Its growing rate is due to demographic reasons, as the ageing society requires the service of an ever growing population. At the same time, the Fidesz government has made several decisions since 2010 (abolishing the mandatory private pension insurance system and confiscating the money gathered there, providing the opportunity for women to retire after 40 years of

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<sup>7</sup> Lakhatási támogatások, Infojegyzet [Housing Subsidies, Infonote] 2016/34, 2016 június 8. [http://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/595001/Infojegyzet\\_2016\\_34\\_lakhatasi\\_tamogatas\\_ok.pdf/dd941c05-3ee5-4fe7-93bd-3f07de619922](http://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/595001/Infojegyzet_2016_34_lakhatasi_tamogatas_ok.pdf/dd941c05-3ee5-4fe7-93bd-3f07de619922)

employment status, and the changes in calculating the amount of pension) that endanger the sustainability of the system.

The second important and expensive area is the healthcare system whose expenditure is more or less invariable. As the healthcare system in Hungary has long been underfinanced, the underpayment of employees, attrition, and emigration cause severe service malfunction of the system.

Family and disability benefits are of medium level. Narrowing the opportunity to obtain disability status, practically abolishing disability pension, and curtailing services in this social group as well resulted in the constriction and tightening of the system of state benefits.

The next category is the circle of various social services constituting the smallest part of all state social benefits. In this area, the government policy is also featured by more rigour and the restriction of the neediness principle in the past period. This includes unemployment benefits, the housing aid, and other social aids. Although the number of people needy of the services grew as a result of the inequalities, impoverishment, and the temporarily increasing unemployment due to the crisis; the extent of redistribution was shrinking. During the past years, socially based redistribution has narrowed, and the total amount of funding is only constant because the expenditures of public employment growing in the period in question is listed as part of this state redistribution. Along with increasing the number of people in public employment, the government practically terminated unemployment benefits.

The social services belong to the last category (services for job seekers related to active labour market policy, patient care for the elderly, childcare services). The deficiencies in this category are demonstrated by the fact that only less 25% of the Hungarian children under the age of 3 frequent official childcare institutions (crèche, kindergarten). This figure is especially low among people with low income (Szivós 2012).

While the welfare state does play a significant role in the distribution of income, and therefore in the shaping of the economic crisis in **Austria**, in the post-crisis period it has also come under enormous pressure. The role of welfare state spending was significant at the beginning in alleviating the worst effects, as the European Commission (2012a) noted. Nevertheless, when the crisis moved to its second phase, and some European governments swifited from deficit-spending to austerity, the situation altered, and welfare spending was one of the main objectives of fiscal consolidation (European Commission 2013c; Feigl 2012; Heise and Lierse 2011). While social protection spending in the EU-27 grew by 7% in 2009, spending was more or less stagnating in 2010, before declining in 2011 and 2012 (Bontout and Lokajickova 2013).

Marterbauer and Schürz (2011) claim, that while major differences exist between the member states, at a time of the economic crisis, the European welfare state has played a central role in preventing a major depression similar to the one in the 1930s. Reducing the consequences of the crisis for individuals (along with tax cuts and further public investment) effectively led to a stabilization of consumption and economy/conjuncture. These were realized by Konjunkturpakete I & II, Steuertarifsenkung, Familien and Arbeitsmarktpaket in Austria. The welfare state prevented people from panic-induced savings caused by growing unemployment



and insecurity, eventually hindering further crises (p. 3). Nonetheless, pressure on the welfare state has grown remarkably: Firstly, the reduction in employment and wages, together with unemployment and early retirement costs, provides long-term extraordinary social security charges. In accordance with this, Austrian national insurance revenues fell by more than € 3 billion. Secondly, growing unemployment and national insurance deficits create a political climate where the so-called welfare scroungers are stigmatized and attempts to reduce social benefits are flourishing easily (Marterbauer and Schürz 2011, p. 8).

The program of reducing social spendings and debating the entitlement of so-called welfare scroungers is mostly voiced by the conservative (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (FPÖ). The needs-based minimum benefit system which was established in 2010 with the aim of standardizing basic social benefits, have been particularly debated by the ÖVP and the FPÖ since 2015, with the influx of large refugee flows in Austria. Despite the fact that the criteria for obtaining a welfare allowance are rather limited (eg. people with savings exceeding € 4.139.13 are not entitled, and need to accept employment offered by the job centre, BMASK 2015), nevertheless, FPÖ demands further restrictions. As their argument goes, especially in the case of larger families (which are considered to be mostly immigrants), this amount is too high in general. Furthermore, they claim that reducing the total benefit-amount would lead to work incentives and therefore lead to a decrease in unemployment (Hofmann et al. submitted).

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### 3. *EXTREME AND POPULIST RIGHT: DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES*

This review seeks to summarize some of the major trends in recent literature about radical right-wing populism and extremism.

#### 3.A. *Defining populism*

A significant part of the literature is devoted to discussing how to define populism. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of articles, even those with a different focus, acknowledge the difficulty of assigning a single definition to populism. This challenge arises at least partially from the long and storied history of the term. It has been used to describe political parties, leaders, and movements in a variety of historical, geographical, and ideological contexts. As Lichtenstein<sup>8</sup> notes, “the term ‘populist’ has become nearly impossible to define: it has become a default phrase for various forms of social or political insurgency, with an ideological content that too often lies in the eye of the beholder” (Lichtenstein 2016, p. 236).

If populism has historically lacked a coherent, cohesive definition, why devote energy to determining one now? One reason is research methodology. Different conceptual understandings emphasize different units of analysis and thereby lend themselves to different methods of research. An established definition of populism would streamline future research. Another reason is the status, for lack of better words, associated with the term populism. The ‘populist’ label carries a strong connotation – usually negative, but sometimes positive<sup>9</sup> – that affects how parties, politicians, and movements are perceived and analyzed. As populist parties continue to become increasingly popular and gain power, precision is imperative. In the next two sections, we will elaborate on these two reasons. We will first describe the major conceptual approaches to defining populism. Afterwards, we will summarize the distinguishing features that characterize populism.

#### 3.B. *Conceptual approaches*

The literature presents three main conceptual approaches to understanding populism: ideology, discourse, and strategy.

Ideology is probably the most widely accepted of these three approaches. The following definition, set forth by Cas Mudde, is the most often cited in recent literature: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, p. 543). Mudde characterizes populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’, a term borrowed from the political theorist Michael Freeden. Freeden defines this form of ideology as “one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts’,

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<sup>8</sup> Although Lichtenstein’s article explicitly focuses on the American brand of populism, we believe its discussion of the history of the term ‘populism’ provides valuable insight for our study (see Lichtenstein 2016, p. 236-238).

<sup>9</sup> Müller discusses the recent trend of non-populist politicians, parties, and movements embracing the ‘populist’ label in hopes of disassociating themselves from the ‘mainstream’. He argues this approach, claiming that populism is ultimately a negative label. (see Müller 2016, p. 88-89.)

exhibiting ‘a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Aslandis 2016, p. 89). As a result, thin-centered ideologies do not provide comprehensive answers to the political questions posed by societies. They also lack internal integration and unity between the ideological producers (Aslandis 2016, p. 89).

Although the ideological approach is the most cited, it is not universally accepted. An ideology, put simply, is a collection of ideas. As a result, research on populism as an ideology places a strong emphasis on political parties and their rhetoric (Gidron and Bonikowki 2013, p. 7). Populism, however, is not only a phenomenon of political parties; as mentioned earlier, movements and individual politicians are often classified as populist. Furthermore, allegiances to ideologies are often seen as dichotomous – you either adhere to it or you do not. If populism is an ideology, degrees of populism cannot exist. This oversimplifies the political landscape and glosses over the fact that non-populist parties can adopt elements of populist discourse (Aslandis 2016, p. 92-93).

The discursive approach hopes to avert this issue. It focuses on the discourse – language and textual data, written or spoken – employed by populists (Aslandis 2016, p. 98). Aslandis presents a compelling case against Mudde’s definition, highlighting the methodological inconsistencies of this definition as well as the shortcomings of the thin-centered ideological approach. He argues for populism to be understood as a discursive frame, working with Goffman’s definition of frames as “‘schemata of interpretation’ that allow their users ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ complex events taking place in daily life” (Aslandis 2016, p. 98). He proposes a populist frame, defined as follows: “Populist discourse can equally be perceived as the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because ‘corrupt elites’ have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization of the latter in order to regain power” (Aslandis 2016, p. 99).

The strategic approach appeared to have the least support in the literature<sup>10</sup>. It defines populism as a “political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Aslandis 2016, p. 96). Although this does indeed describe populism, other scholars are hesitant to adopt this approach. All forms of political action necessarily require strategy, which convolutes analysis. Furthermore, some analysts claim that the strategic approach oversimplifies populism, equating it to mere demagoguery (Aslandis 2016, p. 96).

### ***3.C. Distinguishing features***

The conceptual approach has important implications for research, but fails to explain what classifies a party, politician, or movement as an example of radical right-wing populism. Although a comprehensive, universally-accepted list does not – and probably never will – exist, there is a consensus on certain characteristics. Perhaps the most important one is the emphasis on ‘the people’ (see: Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, p. 3; Mudde 2016, p. 26; Müller 2016, p.

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<sup>10</sup> Here we refer to the literature concerning European and American populism. Gidron and Bonikowski note that the strategic approach is often used to describe Latin American populism (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, p. 10).

81; Spruyt et al. 2016, p. 335-336). Radical right-wing populists juxtapose the pure, innocent common people with the corrupt elites, namely the mainstream political parties and the European Union. They characterize themselves as the true representatives of the common people, who are also often referred to as the ‘forgotten people’ (Müller 2016, p. 81).

This demonization of the elite contributes to the anti-establishment nature of populists on both sides of the political spectrum. They openly criticize the political establishment, claiming that it has lost touch with whom it is meant to serve: the common people (Immerzeel et al. 2016, p. 824). They sometimes go as far as questioning the integrity of existing political structures, institutions, and even democratic procedures (Müller 2016, p. 86).

Müller suggests an interesting revision to the anti-elitism of radical right-wing populism, arguing that they are not only anti-elitist but also necessarily anti-pluralist. By this, he means that this movement relies on separating a heterogeneous, inherently hypothetical group that exists outside any political institution – the people – and portraying them as homogenous and political. They then claim that this group is the *only* legitimate one, and that they are its only legitimate representatives: “The logic of populism is not ‘we are the 99 per cent’, it is: ‘we are the 100 per cent’” (Müller 2016, p. 85). By doing this, populists move politics into the moral dimension. Any opposition is seen as a sign of immorality, any unfavorable result as a sign of immorality and corruption. This reimagining of politics risks destabilizing democracy (Müller 2016).

Another key element of radical right-wing populism is its anti-immigration stance; indeed, there is a general consensus among scholars and commentators that immigration is the most important issue area for right-wing populist parties (Immerzeel et al. 2016, p. 824; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015, p. 281-282). They call for more restrictive immigration policies and quotas. Integration is a related issue. Although the specifics differ, the parties generally call for stricter requirements for integration programs and harsher punishments for noncompliance. In Europe, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ has dominated this conversation in the past couple years (Mudde 2016, p. 25).

A related topic is ethno-nationalism. The rhetoric of the vast majority of right-wing populist parties is highly exclusionary, lauding those of ‘pure’ ancestry and demonizing minorities. Although ethno-nationalism suggests that ethnic minorities are the only groups targeted, this is far from true: religion, sexual orientation, language, immigration history, and gender are also common points of contention (Müller 2016, p. 84). Right-wing populists often argue that members of the proper nation should receive preferential treatment, for example in access to welfare and other government-provided services (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015, p. 281-282).

### ***3.D. Impoundment of the concept of extreme right***

In his already classic work Mudde points out that there are “at least 26 definitions of right wing extremism, which mention no less than 58 features, of which only five, namely nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strive for a strong and encompassing state, are mentioned by more than half of the authors.” (Mudde 1995, p. 206).

According to Enyedi and Körösényi, extreme right parties are characterised by right-wing populism, fascism, national-socialism, and other anti-democratic features. (Enyedi and Körösényi 2001, p. 94). József Bayer (2002) thinks that extreme right ideologies are “usually accompanied by such political and ideological criteria as nationalism, chauvinism, racism, anti-semitism, and intolerance to any kind of minority groups in general, xenophobia, and the inclination to find violent solutions to conflicts (Bayer 2002).

When defining right-wing extremism, Betz, Heitmeyer, and Loch emphasize the following ideological elements: 1. nationalism, 2. militarism, 3. right-wing authoritarianism, 4. charismatic leadership (Betz 2001). According to De Weerd and De Witte (2001), five components of far-right ideologies can be identified in Europe: 1. biological racism is based on the belief that biological differences exist among human races, which lead to inequalities of humans on the basis of inherited inferiority and superiority; 2. extreme nationalism is the central element of the principle of the homogeneous ethnic or national community where the national character of the individual appears as a positive and markedly romanticized image; 3. the basis of authoritarianism is the belief in the necessity of a strong leader; 4. the concept of leadership leads to the rejection of parliamentary democracy as the latter is considered as a weak and ineffective way of solving problems; 5. due to their antidemocratic features these parties are known for their militant opposition to their political opponents (De Weerd and De Witte 2001).

According to Holzer (1993), right extremism can be described as follows: 1. the idea of national community – the living, eternal organism built on a hierarchic, patriarchal order that ensures the social-economic status of the individual; 2. ethno-centrism and racism, a strong division of ‘us and them’ accompanied by the exclusion of strangers and looking down on them; 3. authoritarianism and anti-pluralism, the idea of a strong state and a strong leader; 4. creating enemies, finding scapegoats; 5. the nationalistic approach to history that serves to support personal identity (Holzer 1993, p. 35). During the study of right-wing radical phenomena, Gentile separates five determinant ideological elements: 1. identity elements (cultural, national); 2. refusal of cosmopolitanism and internationalism; 3. making the migration policy stricter; 4. emphasizing law and order; 5. upgrading work, and criticizing capital (Gentile 1995).

Mudde (2000) warns that it has to be distinguished ‘traditional neo-fascist’ from new, ‘post-industrial’ type of radical right-wing populist parties. The new type radical right-wing populist parties distinguish themselves from old-fashioned, neo-fascist extremism, its anti-democracy and inclination to violence. These new type parties rather give a nationalistic response to the challenge of globalisation. (Mudde 2000). Butterwegge (1996) thinks that right-wing extremism and radical right-wing populism are not different phenomena just different levels of the same phenomenon, therefore radical right-wing populism does not need to be considered as a new phenomenon ‘competing’ with right-wing extremism (Butterwegge 1996).

Minkenbergh (2013) contextualizes the radical right in terms of modernization theory. He defines modernization as a “process of social change characterized by increasing functional differentiation and personal autonomy” (2013, p. 11). Right-wing radicalism attempts to counter and/or even dismantle modernization by radically redefining the “exclusionary and inclusionary criteria of belonging” (2013, p. 11). In other words, the radical right overemphasizes images of social and national homogeneity and clearly delineates between the

“in-group,” usually the nation, and the “out-groups,” typically some sort(s) of minorities. The specific criteria for exclusion varies based on the party and/or movement; examples include race, gender, religion, culture, and a combination of one or more of these. See Table 1, extracted directly from the article, for a brief but excellent summary of different types of exclusionary criteria.

**Table 1. Criteria of Exclusion in Right-wing Radical Discourse (Minkenberg 2013)<sup>11</sup>**

Criteria of Exclusion	Core Argument
Racism	Inferiority of the “other” on the grounds of biological difference (“natural” hierarchy)
Antisemitism	Special case of racism
Ethnocentrism	Superiority of own collectivity on the grounds of cultural and economic achievements (developmental differentiation)
Religiocentrism (Fundamentalist)	Superiority of own collectivity on the grounds of a particular faith and exclusionary access to “truth”
Xenophobia	Defensive reaction against ethnic and cultural “others” (fight for resources, fear of “cultural mixing”)
Nativism	Special case of xenophobia (in countries with a history of mass immigration, the rejection of foreign influences regardless of ethnicity)
Heterophobia	Intolerance of deviation from mainstream norms (unacceptability of those who are morally “other”, also within their own ethnicity)

It is important to note that Minkenberg characterizes right-wing radicalism or extremism<sup>12</sup> as an ideology: “right-wing extremism is a political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism” (Minkenberg 2013, p. 11). The key characteristics we can take away from this definition are ultra-nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-pluralism, and anti-individualism.

<sup>11</sup> Sources: Michael Minkenberg, *Die neue radikal Rechte in Vergleich. USA, Frankreich, Deutschland* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutcher Verlag, 1998), p. 119; Wilhelm Heitmeyer, „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit” in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.), *Deutsche Zustände. Vol. 3* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 2005);pp. 14-15.

<sup>12</sup> He uses *radicalism/radicalist* and *extremism/extremist* interchangeably.

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#### 4. ***THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND EXPLANATORY MODELS ON THE ROUTE TO RIGHT WING POPULISM AND EXTREMISM***

Right-wing populism has skyrocketed to the political forefront in Europe and the United States, and there are no signs of this slowing down. Mudde described the current era as the “populist Zeitgeist,” a title that seems ever-increasingly relevant (Mudde 2004, p. 542). This success has encouraged a number of scholars to question why populism, especially radical right-wing populism, became and remains so popular.

Mudde points to structural shifts in European politics and identity beginning in 1960s. In the first decades following WWII, Western European politics was dominated by three major points of consensus: alignment with the US in the Cold War, the need for deeper political integration in Europe, and support for a strong welfare state. Although the political front appeared united, significant shifts in society and politics were simultaneously taking place. Deindustrialization and a sharp decline in religious observance weakened support for center-right and center-left parties, which traditionally garnered support from workers and religious voters. Furthermore, the advent of the internet revolutionized media coverage of politics. Average people had the ability to access more information (whether correct or not) and became more attentive to politics. During this time, the political elite tended to adopt TINA (“there is no alternative”) policies, in which they would prioritize their commitments to supranational organizations, such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, over those to their states. As the consensus on the continent began to fade, ideological alternatives, like populism, began to emerge. Populists capitalized on the growing discontent of the people, gaining the traction we see today (Mudde 2016).

##### ***4.A. The condition of success: emphasizing the supply side***

In the populist program elements mentioned earlier, ideologies and buzzwords with mostly a charismatic leader on the top, moreover using professionally electronic media right wing populist and extremist parties and its leaders as “political entrepreneurs” (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995) were able to tempt voters from moderate parties (see political volatility: Franklin 1992; and political opportunism: Ivaldi 2000) over-emphasizing imaginarian issues like national superiority, ethnic and cultural threats, and anti-migrant sentiments (Savelkoul and Scheepers 2016).

Mudde (2010) therefore criticizes the ‘normal pathology thesis’ (Scheuch and Klingemann 1967) and introduce the term “pathological normalcy” concerning the rise of extreme right emphasizing importance of supply side approaches. He argues that “*populist radical right should be seen as a radical interpretation of mainstream values*” (there are only differences in “degrees” and so, these views are widely accepted in different societies) and focus on political struggles between moderate and extreme right instead of analyzing similar buzzwords and ideologies like nativism, authoritarianism or populism. He notes that the real question should be “*why so few parties have been successful given the generally fertile breeding ground?*”

Spruyt et al. examine who supports populism and why they do so (Spruyt et al. 2016, p. 335). They postulate that feelings of vulnerability, be it economic, societal, or cultural, attract voters

to populism. Populist rhetoric depersonalizes these feelings, placing the responsibility outside the individual. Based on data from a survey of simple random sample of residents of Flanders between the ages 18-75, they used six nested-regression models to assess social differences in support for populism. Their analysis determined that material wealth and level of education strongly relate to support for populism. Decreased levels of wealth and lower education correlated with higher support for populism. Self-perceived political competence was shown to have no effect. The authors ultimately conclude that populism succeeds in providing a coping mechanism for very different feelings of vulnerability, which mainstream parties fail to do (Spruyt et al. 2016). Similarly, Plach (2015), examining differences in success stories of the extreme right in Britain and the Netherlands, notes that besides similar demands populist parties were more successful in the Netherlands because their more professional offer-techniques.

Through analyzing specific Western European countries, Minkenberg (2013) argues that not the actual number of non-natives residing in a country but the degree of success in politicizing the non-native issue directly correlates with support for the radical right. Similarly, Stockemer (2015) found by examining 200 European regions in his research that the number of immigrants has no influence on voting for far-right but only perceptions about immigrants. He concludes that the presence of refugees or other immigrant groups during crises do not explain the rise of the extreme right but much more supply theories and media effects.

Since we are focusing on individual perceptions and reactions in times of crises on the route to right wing extremism and populism, we concentrate henceforward rather on the “demand side”.

#### ***4.B. Reasons for the rise of extreme right parties: a link between socio-economic changes and the appeal of extreme right***

The SIREN project found that literature takes the existing link between socio-economic changes and the success of the extreme right as an axiom. At the same time, socio-economic changes come up in the studies dealing with the relationship between socio-economic changes and the affinity to far-right buzzwords as a combination of the political system, the influence of the media, and various factors of socialisation and attitudes, or psychological explanations, and not in themselves (Koopmans and Kriesi 1997).

The results of the SIREN project demonstrated that not only losers but also winners of the changes can be attracted to the far-right, i.e., not only the economic, material disadvantages lead to the growing popularity of the extreme right (Flecker 2007). Several theories and explanations have been created by the literature on the success of far-right parties trying to reveal the link between socio-economic changes and the popularity of extreme right or radical right-wing populist parties. Here follows the summary of the main theories completed with most recent ones in the field.

#### ***Theories emphasizing the attraction of losers of socio-economic changes and crises to the extreme right***

##### *Macroeconomic approaches: new mercantilism, neoliberalism and austerity*

Flassbeck (2016) notes that the new mercantilist „bagger thy neighbor” economic policy of some European countries (first of all Germany) based on export surplus and the neoliberal



restrictive policy of the Troika (the ECB, the IMF, and the European Commission) based on the neoliberal/neoclassic idea of substitution effect through cutting wages, has destroyed the internal markets and consumption in PIGS countries (to some extent also in France), which led to high unemployment rates and political disillusionment and the rise of support of extreme right parties in Italy, Greece and France (see also: authoritarian neoliberalism by Bruff 2014).

Doležalová (2015) examined the link between economic recessions and the rising electoral support for the extreme right in parliamentary elections in 23 EU countries between 1995 and 2012. She found that GDP decline and growth in unemployment significantly influenced the rise of extreme right voting behaviour in the EU countries under investigation, especially when the country was forced to apply for an IMF loan and to implement strict austerity measures. According to her findings, such a trend lasts for a longer time, extremist parties are able to pass the electoral threshold level and obtain seats in lower houses.


*Disillusionment from and weakening justification of the liberal democratic system and the free market*

System justification theory states that, in addition to being motivated to justify themselves and their social, cultural, or racial in-groups, people have a motive to support the larger system (for example the nation as a broad social and cultural system) they are part of, and to see the status quo as legitimate and good (Jost et al. 2004). Usually, the most advantaged groups show the highest level of support for the system, but, according to the theory, the disadvantaged groups – against their own group and self-interest – often believe that the system is fair, the status quo is legitimate, and their disadvantageous position is justified (Jost et al. 2003).

However, system justification theory also stresses that people protest when the system's legitimacy is seriously eroded mostly in times of serious socio-economic crises, and when alternatives to the status quo become psychologically salient. In addition, people are motivated to rationalize a new or emerging regime as its implementation is seen as increasingly probable (Kay et al. 2002). As we know from earlier research system justification motive, when applied to the need of strengthening nation-states, takes the form of nationalism — for example the belief that one's nation is superior to others (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989).

This is what happened in 2009-2010 in Hungary as we learnt from ISSP 2009 survey data (Grajczjár and Ádám 2015). The low status system justificatory group rebelled against 20 years of 'tumbled liberal democratic development' and open market economy, and 'helped' to close down the first part of post-transition era in Hungary: 58% of the members of former system justificatory group with lower status voted for Fidesz, but among Fidesz voters they were underrepresented (19%), while among Jobbik voters members of the above mentioned group were overrepresented (30%).

Similar revolutionary phenomena can be seen in the PIGS countries during the crisis. As Matthijs (2014) emphasizes, in these countries anti-EU feelings have grown to 70% on the average, disillusionment from democracy (see Figure 1 below, Matthijs 2014), and lack of satisfaction with the functionality of the state and general mistrust are widespread feelings in these countries.

**Figure 1.** *Democracy Index in the Euro-Mediterranean (Matthijs 2014)*

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill” (London, 2013).

### *The crisis of modernity*

The concept of post-industrial right wing extremism emphasises the socio-cultural and socio-economic changes of Western democracies, and the transition from industrial society to post-industrial society (Betz 1994). Beside the positive features, the post-industrial society brings along the loss of identity, the feeling of threat, and wide-spread insecurity. Atomisation and depersonalisation results in the protection of natural communities often inducing racism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia. Growing individualism, personal fulfilment, and the need of confirmation brings about the demand for a strong leader, and the lack of trust in representative democracy. According to Ignazi (2000), the social groups going through a crisis of identity appreciate clear hierarchy, well-defined social borders, order, and a homogeneous society.

The lower social classes and strata (among them the unskilled manual workers, or people with low education) are usually considered to be the losers of the changes in the literature (Lubbers 2001; Van der Brug 2003). The losers of the changes are those incapable of keeping pace with the changes, those lacking the cultural, social, and material resources necessary to succeed, therefore lose the certainty and security in important areas of life during the globalisation and post-industrialisation process (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995). Already in the eighties Falter and Schumann in Italy and France (1988) or later Bale et al. (2010) or Arter (2010) note that the populist right successfully addressed traditional voters of centre-left parties like blue collar workers. According to Mieriņa and Koroļeva (2015) this phenomenon is to be observed in post-communist countries as well, not only in Western European countries. Golder (2016) argues that support for right wing extremism can be strengthened especially among young males, with low level of education, blue collar workers or self-employed during economic and political crises, while these intentions remain rather latent among normal economic developments.

### *The symbolic world*

The process through which employees adapt to the new management techniques was called the new spirit of capitalism by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiappello (1999). The main phenomena of flexible capitalism are flexible working hours, mobility, and the everyday risk of changes. However, these are challenges that require individual labour market strategies, and alternative career paths. According to Sennett (1998), this process can lead to a corrosion of character. The corrosion of the character means the loss of identity, and the insecurity of self-perception and self-esteem. The message of right-wing extremism can serve as a cure for the corrosion of the character by offering the chance to join the symbolic community: nationalism can create the imaginary integration of the individual into the mono-cultural nation state, the national community (Anderson 2006).

### *Job insecurity*

As Castel notes “Through the instability and what we can call [...] the destabilization of work, one of the bases of social integration is being chipped away for many people” (Castel 2000, p. 528). Alongside with cuts in public spending and a tightening of eligibility-criteria for welfare recipients these developments have led to widespread insecurity in many fields of life. Workers are competing for secure jobs, leaving no room for solidarity (Bourdieu 2004, p. 110). Especially in the critical times of economic crises the easily replaceable blue-collar workers of low education, but even trained workers experience social and employment insecurities (Dörre 1997). The feeling of insecurity and vulnerability may result in defensive attitudes, in a need for belonging to an imaginary exclusive community in order to stabilise the self (e.g. nationalism).

Previous research in Europe suggests that job insecurity has an impact on exclusive attitudes and distrust in institutions. The feeling of economic insecurity and flexible employment affect intolerant attitudes (such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism), negative attitudes towards others and political disillusionment – all indicators of right wing voting behaviour (Baughn and Yaprak 1996). Variables such as job insecurity and income deprivation were found to affect distrust in immigrants, i.e., perceived ethnic threat in various European countries (Billiet et al. 2014). Research also suggests that job insecurity indirectly contributes to an affinity towards extreme right parties (De Weerd et al. 2007; De Witte and Meuleman 2007; Grajczár and Tóth 2012): job insecurity was associated with feelings of dissatisfaction, social deprivation, economic strain and fear of losing one’s current social position, which, again translated into intolerant attitudes, such as distrustful attitudes towards migrants and anomia, which have been found to have an impact on extreme-right wing voting intentions and behaviours.

According to research in the US and Australia, job insecurity is linked in a direct way to extreme-right wing voting intentions and behaviour (Mughan and Lacy 2002; Mughan et al. 2003). This phenomenon leads some authors to conclude that job insecurity can be considered as a form of ‘structural violence’, impacting on destructive intergroup conflicts (Schwebel 1997).

*The threatened economic interest theory*

The threatened economic interest theory is searching for an answer to prejudices and hostile attitudes towards immigrants. According to Lipset, the intolerant, exclusivist mentality is typical of the working class because of its bad economic situation, due to the fight for poor resources (Lipset 1966). This train of thought lead to the modern conflict theory (Campbell 1967), according to which, the chauvinist, xenophobic politics of extreme right-wing parties is based on such differentiations as distinguishing strangers from fellow-nationals, the assumption of their competition, and undertaking the service and interests of the people belonging to the nation in this competition.

*The danger of social and cultural deprivation*

This theory argues that some people find it hard to face the challenges generated by the accelerating world, multiculturalism, and rapid social changes. They are practically lost in the mazes of social and cultural changes, being unable to tolerate the changes generated by the accelerating world. The demand for the exclusivist politics of national closing in can be an 'identity stabilising tool' to counterbalance such insecurity and losing the ground, promising the national in-group security, well-deserved, calculable economic position and order in the society (Kriesi et al. 1998; Vester 2001, p. 299).

*The cracked social identity*

Both the theories of social identities (Tajfel 1969) and the theories of self-categorization (Turner et al. 1987) offer an explanation to the radicalization of political attitudes. Extremism and attitudinal rigidity can help people place themselves in the world and be aware of what they represent and only take notice of problems that prove them right (Rogers 1951). Consequently, the consciousness of personal inconsistency may result in systematic compensational rigidity. The individuals' response to being threatened is confirming their real or imaginary group affiliation (Kelly 1955). Nationalism as an imaginary bond is offered by right-wing extremism as a substitute for the traditional collective identity considered as threatened or destroyed by modernisation and the market. The erosion of the work structure and the dissolution of the traditional communities or group cultures – like working class culture – can contribute to the identity crisis and lead to patriotism and nationalism, which can be observed since the eighties (Gundelach 2001).

*Political dissatisfaction, and protest voting*

According to the theory of political dissatisfaction and protest voting, people affected negatively by the socio-economic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they have no influence on political processes. The attitude of political dissatisfaction means that voters do not even expect anything positive from traditionally governing moderate powers – be it in government or in opposition. This attitude can result in protest voting. By protest voting, we mean that voters disappointed by moderate parties vote for marginal and extreme parties displaced from the "traditional" political space, and as excluded, takes solidarity with the excluded (Van den Brug et al. 2000).

*The radicalization of the political centre and the winners of the changes**Political centre and extreme right*

According to Butterwegge (2002), roots of right-wing extremism need to be explained on concomitance of three phenomena on different levels. Firstly, the socio-economic level: racism, social Darwinism, nationalism, or sexism root back to the spread of strong competition principle of the capitalist system (reconstruction of the society by right of market logic). Secondly, the social climate: the dismantling of the welfare state and the support of emergence of up-bottom pressure by the state where the upper social classes compete with other social strata for resources and tries to exclude and discriminate the weaker and minority groups from redistribution (through bottom-up redistribution which leads to the demolition of social integration). And thirdly, the political culture: following ideologies, political routines which disdain minority groups (e.g. nationalism, sexism etc.). In this case not only the losers of modernization or socio-economic changes will vote for the extreme right, but the political centre will be radicalized through radicalized social norms and social stereotypes. So, he argues, radicalism comes from the centre of the society (see also: Hitler's supporters by Hamilton 2014; or the impact of extreme right parties on the immigration policy in moving immigration to the center of political discourse and achievement hegemony through immigration debate in Europe by Carvalho 2013 or Yilmaz 2012).

*Interrelation between the efficiency of the welfare state, its crisis, nationalism and welfare chauvinism*

Balibar (2010) argues that social and welfare systems – which made people by social citizenship a quasi-owner of collective benefits – were already in the 19th century inseparable from the sustainment of the national form of the state and its hegemony for the regulation of „*Klassenkämpfe*“. Georgi (2013) recognizes in this national social privilege a (neo) feudalistic principle, since citizenship is given for people born in the given country („*blood and soil*“) and, on the other hand, this form of the state generates nationalism as an ideology which makes integrated people dependent from the state (see economic nationalism or methodological nationalism and mercantilism by Wallerstein, quoted by Zündorf 2010, p. 59).

The massive changes in the welfare systems in Western Europe have produced a new wave of welfare chauvinism (Hentges and Flecker 2006, p. 140). Welfare chauvinism originally came from the new right in Scandinavia which parties firstly protested against higher taxes and excrement bureaucracy. This became linked then to socio-cultural conflicts, and the issue of immigration (Rydgren 2006, p. 165). The media and right-wing populists interpreted this issue as an ethnic problem, reached the centre of societies and blamed for refugee, helper organizations, social democrats and immigrants responsible for the social problems within the society (Rydgren 2006, p. 168-172). Kaindl emphasizes that this attitude goes for disabled, unemployed and other inactive people as well and, characterize the middle of the society and even trade union's circles too (Kaindl 2006, p. 72).

Lefkofridi and Michel (2014) use the term of exclusive solidarity for better understanding the new programmatic direction of some Western European extreme right parties in the last decade.

They emphasize that recent developments on the extreme right are in many cases not to be characterized as economically right anymore, but they focus on (restrictive) welfare redistribution very intensively. Best examples are the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ (but more or less right-wing populist parties to similar extent in Finland, Norway and Sweden too).

Betz and later on Kitschelt (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995) note the importance of debates about the welfare state and its benefits. According to these studies, the extreme right is able to break through in countries where the welfare state is strong. There are two aspects to discuss this phenomenon: on the one hand, without the existence of a strong welfare state there is no strong out-group rejection within the society blaming out-groups for only using state benefits as 'scrounger', and, on the other hand, there is no fight between neoliberal more market stands, more statism, and more redistribution views.

### *The fear of déclasserment*

According to the theory of fear of déclasserment, the middle class, feeling its socio-economic position and identity threatened, may fasten together in the modernisation process, and their exclusive in-group protection and concern for its status may lead to affinity to right-wing extremism. According to Lipset, the fear of déclasserment and from the socialist-proletarian revolution, combined with an economic crisis, may radicalize the middle class and this radicalization process can make the extreme right parties successful (Lipset 1966). Focusing on individual reactions to the socio-economic change and its adverse consequences, perceptions, evaluations and agency may be understood with reference to class positions and social milieus. Vester (2001) identifies 'declassed' groups who cultivate resentments against weaker individuals and foreigners, thus respond to their feelings of being excluded by excluding others.

### *Social dominance orientation (new racism)*

The theory of social dominance orientation examines the connections within one's own group distinguishing the egalitarian and hierarchic approaches (Pratto et al. 1994). Within the own group, the inclination to the social sub- and super-ordination (inferiority-superiority) approach determines whether people support political programmes aiming to maintain social differences or ones to promote equality. The key to the theory of social dominance is the wish to rule over others represented mostly by winners of socio-economic changes. This social Darwinist concept is based on a meritocratic vision of society: only the exclusive group of the worthy has the capacities and abilities necessary to survive and adapt rapidly to socio-economic changes. The belief in natural selection results in the constant confirmation in identity and the need to maintain inequalities.

### *Synthesizing winner and loser theories*


Based on literature, already in the SIREN project we identified five large groups of attitudes during the analysis of the theories on socio-economic changes, and the growth of extreme right and radical right-wing populist parties, which are equally related to the rapid socio-economic changes and the affinity to far-right or radical right-wing populist views. The five large groups of attitudes are the following:

1. nationalism and chauvinism, which can take the form of ethnocentrism, in-group defence, or imaginary integration,
2. prejudice towards the out-group, typically finding a scapegoat, counter-immigration, or xenophobia,
3. the attitude of political powerlessness and disappointment accompanied by anti-elitism and protest voting,
4. authoritarian, strict order and law-centred approach, accompanied by the need to restrict democracy to a certain degree, and the wish for a charismatic leader,
5. social dominance orientation appearing as racism, new racism, and social Darwinism.

Reanalysing the literature has shown that beside the losers of today's changes, the winners of the changes can also be attracted to the ideology of the extreme right and can develop attitudes related to the extreme right: some may feel to belong to the superior group of the winners due to their security, satisfaction, and being honoured; while others may temporarily experience stress and being threatened as relative winners of the changes, which may also lead to an affinity for the exclusive interpretation of solidarity, and right-wing extremist ideas, and the radicalisation of their attitudes. The losers are mainly distinguished from the winners by the feeling of deprivation, becoming uncertain, being declassified, dissatisfaction, and the lack of symbolic and financial appreciation – which are more individual perceptions than objective situations.

The SIREN quantitative results suggested two routes linking perceived change in job conditions to distrust and intolerance (Flecker 2007). The 'winners' route related to workers, who felt employable and, as a consequence, emphasised attitudes of competition and exclusion. They opted for reducing competitors on the labour market (e.g., migrants). The winners stressed attitudes such as social dominance orientation (e.g. to legitimate inequality and dominance of some groups over others), expressed chauvinism, prejudice against immigrants and authoritarian attitudes to, ultimately, favouring right-wing parties. The 'losers' route experienced negative changes at work, which made them feel powerless and isolated, leading to distrust and intolerance. They felt deprived, which fostered a negative attitude towards immigrants, political powerlessness and authoritarian attitudes, and ultimately led to a preference for extreme right-wing parties (Figure 2).

**Figure 2.** Routes linking perceived change in job conditions to distrust and intolerance (Flecker 2007)



Note: Only most significant path coefficients ( $p < .001$ ) are reported.

### *Alternative explanations*

#### *Recent research results questioning socio-economic effects on voting right wing extremist parties*

Zhirkov (2014) notes that voters of extreme right parties are not to be marked as socially alienated groups (see Scheepers et al. 1995) or by premodern thinking in Western Europe. What is more, they have shown political satisfaction, which can be a sign of justification of the liberal democratic system and neoliberal welfare capitalism. The most important characteristics of the electorate are rather the refusal of immigration, parties supporting multiculturalism and anti-statism. His research shows that ideological orientations are the most important factors on the route to voting for the extreme right in all Western European countries under investigation, which remain relatively stable over time, consequently, he did not find a direct link between perceptions of the crisis and the rise of voting behaviour to extreme right.

Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2014) examined the EP elections of 2014 and found that although extreme right parties have grown in Denmark, Hungary, France, Austria, Finland, England or Greece during the recent crisis but their support has declined in many European countries compared to the 2009 results. Moreover, in some countries hit most by economic crisis such as Spain, Portugal or Ireland a significant voting intention to extreme right cannot be observed.

Koronaoui et al. (2015) argue that pro-fascist orientation of youngsters and so their support for Golden Dawn in Greece is not only the consequence of anger and political disillusionment because of the crisis but it roots back to the ideological and political socialization (and political transformation process) over the past three decades.



Bedock and Vasilopoulos (2015) compared their research results in Italy and Greece and found that a declining standard of living has not led more support for far-right among voters in Italy, since the League's politicians have not changed their traditional political focus to issues concerning the crisis, while Golden Dawn started to blame immigrants and political elites for austerity politics and economic collapse.

Polyakova (2015) examined the differences in success stories of extreme right parties in 27 Western European and CEE countries between 1991 and 2012. She found that immigration issues, economic developments or types of electoral institutions do not explain differences in voting behaviours for the extreme right between Eastern and Western European countries, but rather political stability and social trust were the most important factors which explained differences.

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## 5. *THE RISE OF EXCLUSIVIST ATTITUDES AND PARTIES IN HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA*

### 5.A. *Historical context after the system change '89-90 – MIÉP, Fidesz, Jobbik*

#### *MIÉP*

Following the system change, Hungary had to face a deep social and economic depression characterised primarily by the relapse of employment, increasing inflation, the economy falling into recession, a high rate of unemployment, and the impoverishment of a significant amount of social groups. Although the fall of the middle class could be halted between 1997 and 2001 with the help of the Bokros package that was considered brutal at the time (Tölgyessy 2014), inequalities did not shrink: while the tight wealthy group became richer, the poor got even poorer (Éltető and Havasi 2011). This resulted in the party operating with right-wing populist slogans, Fidesz getting into power for the first time in 1998, and, taking advantage of the worsening public sentiment, pursued such inexorable “fire-trench politics” that even the rhetoric of the far-right MIÉP party became acceptable and this way crossed the threshold of 5% necessary to get into parliament.

The overview of program, the demands and the political language of MIÉP made fairly clear that MIÉP was an extreme right party in the disguise of a national radical party. It aimed at constructing an ethnocentric and controlled market economy and a semi-democratic regime, which would have enabled the governing party to control political forces that were deemed to be representing adversarial interests to those of conceptualised by the governing party on an ethnocentric platform. It aimed to limit the pluralism of the society by excluding those elements considered by MIÉP as enemies under foreign, most notably Jewish influence and have linkages to the state socialist regime. MIÉP was presenting itself to be the only authority able to judge the existence of such linkages. Moreover, the party claimed to be aware of a conspiracy among Jewish international financial circles and communists, which made the construction of enemy images and scapegoating possible.

The peculiarities of the emerging party system and the historical connections between today’s extreme right and moderate right, however, led to certain overlaps between the political programmes of the extreme and moderate right. This overlap allowed a much wider spread of elements of extreme right thinking in public medias and in the public opinion than the numerical strength of the extreme right would justify.

Nevertheless, the extreme right-wing thinking survived forty years of state-socialism and with the transition the hibernated followers re-adopted the pre-war RWE to modern conditions, maintaining anti-semitism and connecting it to globalisation. The fact that an important size of elderly supporters of MIÉP lived in elite districts of Buda suggests the importance of the survival of pre-war extreme right wing version of Christian-Hungarian thinking.

However, the support for MIÉP was a result of protest of ‘losers’ of the transition too. Besides, it was increasingly coming from the rising domestic entrepreneurial strata and professionals and core employees of public administration, public service and public utility sector, which perceived that intrusion of foreign investors, globalisation and liberal economic policies were

limiting their prospect of advancement. Moreover, the support for MIÉP was increasingly coming from the strata of students in universities, who were protesting the grim employment prospects in the public sector and became indoctrinated by the increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic language of public media.

### ***FIDESZ***

MIÉP – doing politics as the opposition of the opposition – often voted with Fidesz together (Hajdú 2001) and the first attempt of the right-wing re-socialisation of the Hungarian society was started fundamentally along exclusive nationalistic ideas. However, this attempt failed in 2002. The new left-wing government was only able to maintain the standard of living, and raising the salaries of certain employment groups through serious indebtedness (along with a continuous economic decline), concealed during the election campaign of 2006 and so being able to win again (Tölgyessy 2014). However, in the so-called speech of Ószöd Prime Minister Gyurcsány admitted the lie and the probability of a new era of recession to come, which resulted in riots linked to the right-wing opposition and emerging right-wing movements in the autumn of 2006 in Budapest. The Prime Minister refused to resign, which was worsened by police brutality against demonstrators on 23 October, 2006.

The autumn of 2006 opened a new chapter in Hungary's history. General disillusionment, recession, impoverishment on the one hand, and the inexorable rhetoric manifestations of the right-wing opposition trying to find a scapegoat, the regular paralysing of parliamentary work, and permanent demonstrations were in favour of the strengthening of right-wing nationalistic, anti-globalist, and anti-EU movements and parties on the one hand, and the marked right shift of the society on the other hand (Tóth and Grajczjár 2015).

The economic crisis of 2008, the political corruption scandals, and the critical state of the economic and political management finally forced Prime Minister Gyurcsány to resign, but the new Prime Minister Bajnai did not manage to create an economic and social policy convincing enough for the broad spectrum of the society until the new elections. In a radicalized atmosphere, the European Parliament elections in 2009 resulted in the success of Fidesz and Jobbik, and the elections of 2010 were won by Fidesz practically without an actual programme (Szűts et al. 2015), also winning a two-thirds majority in parliament. Taking advantage of the two-thirds majority, and the vengeful public sentiment, Orbán set to the slogan of restoration of economic autonomy (“A Nemzeti Együttműködés Programja” 2010). The relativisation of the Horthy regime, and using and partly realising the political programme of Jobbik<sup>13</sup> played an active part with a double purpose: on the one hand, to take the wind from Jobbik's sails, and, on the other hand, to start a process that makes the return of parties considered earlier as left-liberal impossible.

In order for this, Orbán has extremely centralised his system, introduced a new constitution based on a nationalistic credo, conquered the majority of printed and online media, transformed

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<sup>13</sup> For example: diminishing Hungary's role in World War II., freedom fight against the EU, strong anti-migration campaign, nationalizations in the financial sector, the public utility sector and the private pension system, public work for the unemployed, eastern opening and stronger ties with illiberal and authoritarian regimes first of all with Russia, eliminating the separation of church and state (for a more detailed analysis see: Political Capital 2015)

the public media to make it the propaganda channel of the government, started to create a new upper class called “national capitalists”, to position the groups loyal to him, to nationalise the education system and to fill it with national authors, to reduce the number of graduates at universities and colleges, to establish some “own” national universities, and to create an illiberal society based on work (for a more detailed analysis see: Bajomi-Lázár 2013; Sipos 2014; Csillag and Szelényi 2015; Ágh 2016; Enyedi 2016; Kornai 2016). The main feature of the latter is the anti-poor policy based on public work which – in most cases - does not lead back to the world of work, and which mostly excludes people with low salaries from family benefits and, at the same time, encourages well-to-do families to have more children (Szeredi 2013). The low flat income tax also only favours people with high income, while the highest VAT in Europe mainly afflicts the poorest groups.

An important feature of Orbán’s system is the freedom fight against the EU, keeping the society constantly ready by rumours by anti-migration and anti-refugee rhetoric (Krekó and Mayer 2015). Orbán has curtailed the authority of the constitutional court, made the legal system operated by checks and balances meaningless, transformed the election system and shapes legislation according to the momentary interests of his own party, and the parliament’s role is practically confined to voting the ideas of the government. Orbán only tolerates leaders loyal to him in the cultural, academic, and political spheres as well.

The Fidesz-led right-wing government initiated a number of high profile conflicts with NGOs with international backgrounds, especially targeting those receiving and redistributing the Norwegian Grants and those being supported by Hungarian-American businessman, philanthropist George Soros.

### ***Jobbik***

Jobbik was founded in 1999 by right-wing university students, many of them socialized or started their careers in MIÉP and the right-wing Civic Circles created by Orbán. Disillusioned by the Orbanian (“neo-liberal politics in a conservative disguise”) and Csurkian (Jewish conspiracy theories) politics, the young people founded a party in 2003 (Movement for a Better Hungary). Gábor Vona became the party’s president following the failed elections in 2006, the new programme of Jobbik is linked to him (Gábor Bethlen programme), and he created the paramilitary Hungarian Guard banned in 2009. Vona made the Arpad striped flag of the Nazi-ally Arrow Cross Party the symbol of his party, and announced a markedly exclusivist extreme right-wing campaign. One of its victims was the Hungarian Roma population, but Jobbik did not spare the gay, the Jews, or the left-wing liberals either. During the riots in the autumn of 2006, the former vice-president of Jobbik, László Toroczkaï was also affected in the siege of, setting fire to and despoilment of the TV headquarters.<sup>14</sup> The economic, political and corruption crisis of 2008, the radicalising tone of Fidesz, the murder in Olaszliszka (where men of Roma origin killed a Hungarian man), and the popularity of the Hungarian Guard created to curb “Gypsy crime” brought the first success for Jobbik (for a more detailed analysis, see: Buzogány 2011; Karácsony and Róna 2011; Kovács 2013; Varga 2014; Tóth and Grajczjár 2015). The

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<sup>14</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NJvNRvYtNM>

party received nearly 15% of the votes at the EP elections, nearly 17% at the parliamentary elections of 2010, and over 20% in 2014 (Nemzeti Választási Iroda 2014).

The most important feature of Jobbik is its revolt against the embedded liberalism of the open internal market of the European model, and that of the liberal democratic state building model followed in the region after 1989 (on embedded liberalism see: Ruggie 1982).

*“Jobbik was grown on the soil of the failure of the system change to ensure quick catch-up with Europe, but become popular following a major existential crisis of globalized capitalism. National radicalism developed in Hungary – one of the relative poor, “illfare” societies of East Central Europe where the sudden opening up of the market after the regime change not only shattered security and brutally divided the not yet middle-classed society into winners and losers.” (Tóth and Grajczjár 2015)*

Jobbik offers by its simple populist slogans and putative national truths a new regime through ‘clean hand’ policy, protection for ‘common men’ and of national interests. Nevertheless, it offers a strong, fair, meritocratic and safe nation state based on law and order policy as seen in the last political campaigns of the party. Jobbik is a radical party in a sense that it advocates revolutionary radical change to put the nation on a new development route akin to the „third way model” (between capitalism and socialism) proposed in the thirties (Monostori 2005), based on small private entrepreneurs in locally closed national markets, which would create an ethically and morally new and „right” nation as a new system. It is also radical in the sense that its political behaviour is driven by anger and hatred against the elites “serving foreign interests” and facilitating the exploitation of the virtuous people. It is nationalistic as its concept of nation is diametrically opposed to the traditional patriotism and it promotes an ethnocentric nationalism directed against minorities “unable” to assimilate culturally to the “nation”.<sup>15</sup> Finally, it is populist by demanding a strong state that ensures „socialistic” style welfare support and jobs for the „virtuous” and „hard working” people, excluding minorities like the Roma, who are deemed as culturally distinct and living on welfare support and crime (see Halasz 2009; Magyar 2011; Nagy et al. 2012; Grajczjár and Kenéz 2015; Tóth and Grajczjár 2015).

### *Softening up?*

Preparing for the elections of 2018, Jobbik (seemingly) softened its politics and Vona tried to get rid of its most radical vice presidents. The word ‘seemingly’ needs to be emphasized as, on the one hand, he asked one of the most radical figures of Hungarian politics, László Toroczkai to become one of the vice-presidents, and, on the other, the party’s actions towards refugees is constantly exclusivist and inciting (Jobbik 2015b; Tóth 2015). As mayor of a village at the southern border, Toroczkai banned – violating the constitution – wearing burkas, building mosques, or promoting homosexuality in the municipality (hvg.hu 2016). Tamás Sneider, former skinhead leader is also among the vice-presidents (Tageblatt.hu 2014). At a municipality

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<sup>15</sup> Lukács highlighted the difference between the patriotism of traditional conservative elites and that of ethnocentric racist nationalism of the Nazi party in the interwar years in Germany (Lukács 1998).

forum, Sneider admitted that the softening of Jobbik is merely a communication trick in order to gain the votes of moderate voters, first of all the votes of pensioners. Nevertheless, the votes of openly national socialist (Szent Korona Rádió 2013) Betyársereg ('The Army of Outlaws') are also counted on since they can directly say what Jobbik in Parliament cannot (Magyar 2015).

### **FPÖ**

Established in 1956, as a successor to the short-lived Federation of Independents, (VdU) which was considered to be a "conglomerate of former Nazis, German nationalists and a few liberals" (Bailer et al. 2000, 106), FPÖ in contrast aimed to represent the "third camp" of Austrian policy, to be composed of both German nationalists, and liberal political flows as well. Anton Reinthaller, its first party leader was a former Nazi minister and SS officer, naturally meaning that numerous former Nazis "felt at home" in FPÖ: "The first program was a brief catalogue catch-phrases corresponding to the political interests of former NSDAP members" (Falkenberg 1997, 81). He was replaced by another former SS officer, Friedrich Peter in 1958, who led the party until 1978 and moved it further to the center and even involved the liberals in the party structure. Bailer et al. (2000, 107) claim that this marks a "geniune ideological change in the FPÖ", in terms of reevaluating liberalism.

The "young liberal forces" seemed to be making their final breakthrough in the FPÖ at the beginning of the 1980s. Norbert Steger, criticised from the right, often both from within and outside the FPÖ, and particularly by Jörg Haider, for his "left-wing liberal" course, was voted as party leader of the 1980 Congress (Bailer et al. 2000, 111). The final victory of the far-right forces at the 1986 Congress can be regarded as the "putch-like" takeover of the FPÖ (Falkenberg 1997, 109). As Rösslhumer puts it (1999, 22), with Jörg Haider's takeover what we see is FPÖ's move towards its "populist protest" phase (Grajczjár et al. 2018).

As Jörg Haider took the lead in 1986, the FPÖ became an "authoritarian leader party" (Bailer 1995, 273). Under Jörg Haider, right-wing extremism was more integrated in the party through its membership (through the influx of the traditional far-right and German-nationalists, and the growing influx of neo-Nazis), albeit at the same time in the official presentation of the program and party, the German-nationalist ideology and symbolism have been abandoned. While Jörg Haider resigned from leadership in February 2000, the internal FPÖ policy was still informally dominated by Jörg Haider, a "simple party member".

Based on the analysis of the party programme and the position taken on selected topics, the cornerstones of the FPÖ led by Haider can be summarized as follows:

- *Xenophobia, ethnocentrism, racism and anti-semitism*: immigrants are presented as equivalent to criminals and social scroungers, in the case of whom social and material discrimination and expulsion can be considered lawful.
- *Volksgemeinschaft ideology*: Volk has become an "organically advanced" reality. The Austrian Volk were hard-working and virtuous Austrians. Because this kind of person (rising above and outside of interest and class conflict) was rather artificial, a collective identity (the "organically advanced Volk"), the necessary ideology of "Austrian patriotism", had to be shaped.

- Enemy image and scapegoat construction: public institutions such as the chambers [of commerce and labor] and other interest groups have been framed as exploiters and parasites and contrasted with hard-working decent people. The same thing happened towards the “lower” levels, to "social security baggage" (which includes beneficiaries of social security contributions, unemployed and student recipients), as well as "externally", towards immigrants and asylum seekers, constructed as "welfare-tourists" or "bogus asylum seekers".
- *Authoritarianism and anti-pluralism*: Haider's depiction of himself as advocate of "ordinary folk", helpless and voiceless people; in need of a strong man to combat corruption, party-card economy, and struggle for “real” democracy for them. The party’s aim was to discredit and deligitimize the current democratic system as non-democratic; demanding the elimination of parliamentarism (linking it to the development of the plebiscite elements), a stronger state, that would apply more severe sanctions and act hard against those who did not (want) to belong to the hard-working and decent collective of Austrian citizens.
- *The nationalist view of history and the suppression of Nazism*: in the style of the new right rhetoric – comparing the crimes of the Holocaust and imperialist powers among others.

2006 saw the splitting up of FPÖ: the FPÖ (a more pronounced stance towards right-wing nationalist populism) on the one hand, and the BZÖ a (stronger orientation towards the right-wing liberalism) on the other. While initially this caused a temporary weakening of FPÖ, from 2006 onwards, under the leadership of Heinz Christian Strache, the party gained significant strength. Since then we can witness a constant growth in regional and national election results, FPÖ has gained government participation in Upper Austria (part of the coalition with ÖVP since 2015) and Burgenland (part of the SPÖ coalition since 2016). Norbert Hofer, FPÖ’s candidate won the first round of the presidential elections in 2016 but lost in the second with a close margin (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2016). Until 2019, the FPÖ was part of the governing coalition together with ÖVP in Austria. In terms of ideology, under Strache’s leadership, the party was markedly right-wing, explicitly xenophobic and racist. While its economic program can be described as liberal, and therefore beneficial for the elites, at the same time it appears as a representative of anti-elite and deprived forces (Grajczár et al. 2018).

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## 6. ***METHODOLOGY AND THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF AGGREGATED VARIABLES FOR EMPLOYED SAMPLING***

This paper presents the most important results of the SIREN and SOCRIS surveys in Austria and Hungary. SIREN was conducted in the summer of 2003 after the elections in both countries, while SOCRIS between July and September in 2017, rather close to the parliamentary elections in both countries. The surveys were based on representative samplings of employed people. The databases were weighted with the help of the European Labour Force Survey 2002 and 2016 data, so, our data are representative of gender, age categories, level of education, and degree of urbanization among employed people between 18 and 65 years.

The SOCRIS questionnaire – as a quantitative tool of the follow-up research of the SIREN project – was based more or less on the structure of the SIREN questionnaire. It began with a socio-demographic block (using variables like gender, age, settlement type, education, etc.), followed by a labour market block (using variables like employment and occupational position, sector, or work-contract). The next block measured the perceptions of socio-economic changes by using variables like perceptions of changes in the amount of work, work autonomy, or job security.<sup>16</sup>

Then we measured socio-psychological drivers like subjective wellbeing, social attachment and collective relative deprivation.

This was followed by an attitudinal block measuring social dominance orientation (SDO), ethnocentrism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and political powerlessness. Then we asked respondents about their political orientations and voting behaviours. Finally, we measured the subjective incomes of the respondents.

In this paper, all analyses were based on simple, multiple and step by step multiple linear regression models using confidence intervals for comparing round and country results. Moreover, we built path models for analysing latent processes on routes from perceptions of socio-economic changes to far-right party affinity in both rounds and in both countries.

In the followings we present the most important variables – besides socio-demographic (like gender, age, education) and labour market ones, (occupational position, work-system), types of work contracts (open ended, fixed term) or sector (public, private) – used by the comparative analyses.

### **Socio-economic changes (SEC index) – the role of job insecurity, changes in the amount of work and in autonomy, subjective wellbeing**

Previous research in Europe suggests that job insecurity has an impact on exclusive solidarity and the distrust in institutions. Feelings of economic insecurity and flexible employment affect intolerant attitudes (such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism), negative attitudes towards others (such as anomia and misanthropy) and political disillusionment – all indicators of exclusivist forms of solidarity and right wing voting behaviour (Baughn and Yaprak 1996; De Weerd et al. 2007; De Witte and Meulemann 2007). Job insecurity was associated with feelings

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<sup>16</sup> The SOCRIS (2017) questionnaire, however, was complemented 1) by situations of unemployed respondents (registration, benefits, last occupational positions, reasons of unemployment, or chances of being employed) and, 2) variables measuring inclusive types of solidarity, as well.



of dissatisfaction, social deprivation, economic strain and fear of losing one's current social position, which in turn translated into intolerant attitudes, such as distrustful attitudes towards migrants and anomia, which have been found to impact extreme-right wing voting intentions and behaviours.

The next important variable here is autonomy. Melvin Kohn showed how differences in autonomy influenced the values and perceptions of workers (Kohn, M. L., & Schooler, C. 1982). Subsequent research has shown that job autonomy even has an immediate effect on the economic attitudes of workers (De Weerd & De Witte, 2001).

Next we considered the amount of work people had to do, and more precisely if there have been changes in this. The assumption was that a strong increase in workload, not accompanied by any kind of compensation (e.g. increase in income or autonomy) could instigate feelings of deprivation and cause frustration (De Weerd & De Witte, 2001).

Income deprivation, which was found to affect distrust towards immigrants, i.e., perceived ethnic threat in various European countries (Billiet et al. 2014), was measured by creating a subjective wellbeing variable (measured as principal component by combining changes in the financial situation of the family, optimism concerning the financial possibilities of the family in the near future, and subjective income).

### **Appreciation/collective relative deprivation**

Status, work and income are all important values in modern Western societies. As earlier presented, some people find it hard to face the challenges generated by the accelerating world, multiculturalism, and rapid social changes. Feelings of competition, for example with minorities, might therefore be expected to be stronger if one thinks his or her job is threatened, or has suffered income or status loss. Deprivation of the attainment of norms, which is considered important to assess personal success (getting ahead or further in life), could then lead to frustration. Deprived persons, in sum, are in this sense more likely to hold unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups. As mentioned, the demand for the exclusivist politics of national closing in can be seen as an 'identity stabilising tool' to counterbalance such insecurity and losing the ground, promising the national in-group security, well-deserved, calculable economic position and order in society (Kriesi et al. 1998, Vester 2001: 299).

Collective relative deprivation was operationalized as follows:

- q19\_1 - the appreciation that people like me get is not proportionate to the appreciation we deserve
- q19\_2 - people like me get rewarded for their effort
- q19\_3 - people like me have the power needed to defend our interests

### **Social attachment (workplace integration)**

The literature on right-wing populism and extremism often addresses more general and more long term socio-economic change such as "individualisation" in which traditional societal institutions – such as the occupational group –, lose their former security and protective function. This may lead to social isolation, insecurity of action and to feelings of powerlessness – anomic conditions that can be targeted by right-wing extremist ideology (Heitmeyer 1992).

The complexity and the contradictions of contemporary society may lead to problems of orientation. In such a situation, extreme-right ideological elements such as nationalism may help individuals to create a subjective sense of consistency (Zoll 1984).

In investigating the presence of such a link, we speculated already in the SIREN project that this would be more likely to happen when people, in addition to experiencing changes at work, also experience a crisis in their identification with meaningful social categories at work were incorporated into the questionnaire, including both an identification with a limited and very concrete social category such as the work group, and an identification with wider and more abstract social categories such as the organisation, and an imaginary one like the nation (Jetten, O'Brien and Trindall 2002).

Thus, social attachment (workplace integration) was operationalized as follows:

- q20\_1 - I feel strong ties with my workgroup/colleagues
- q20\_3 - I feel strong ties with my company/organization
- q20\_5 - I feel strong ties with Austria/Hungary

### **Authoritarianism**

Authoritarianism was first investigated as a possible explanation for the surprising overrepresentation of blue-collar workers in the NSDAP electorate, but has come a long way since then. In the present research authoritarian personality is referred to as a combination of a need of submission and a need of domination. According to Ignazi (2000), the social groups going through a crisis of identity appreciate clear hierarchy, well-defined social borders, order, and a homogeneous society.

Basically, recent theory and measurement instruments hereby draw upon three dimensions (Altemeyer, 1988): conventionalism, authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression. It is this approach we adopted from the theory of psychological interests in this research.

- q22\_12 - obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn
- q22\_13 - most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral and anti-social people
- q22\_14 - we need strong leaders who tell us what to do

### **Social dominance orientation (SDO)**

The theory of social dominance orientation examines relationships between groups, distinguishing between the egalitarian and hierarchical concepts. The key element of the theory of SDO is the desire for domination over others based on a meritocratic approach. The attitude of ruling over others is closely related to nationalism, chauvinism and authoritarianism. Increasing competition on the labour market and individual responsibility, self-care, especially among the winners of the changes, can lead to the idea 'the winner takes it all'. Accordingly, the unmerited, lazy stragglers fall away from the market in fierce competition, and this creates the dominance of the hard working worthy people in the society.

We chose two important variables from the original operationalization of Sidanius and Pratto's (2001) work:

- q22\_1 - some people are just inferior to others
- q22\_2 - to get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others

### **Political powerlessness (disappointment)**

As mentioned, people affected negatively by the socio-economic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they have no influence on political processes. By protest voting, we mean that voters disappointed by moderate parties vote for marginal and extreme parties displaced from the "traditional" political space. Of course, exclusive attention to protest voting as an explanation has proven to be problematic, because large parts of the electorate have shown affinity with the extreme right-wing ideology itself as well (see Falter and Klein 1994). This is of course one of the reasons this theoretical approach is just one among others that we chose to include in our theoretical set-up.

The operationalization of political powerlessness is as follows:

- q23\_1 - it seems that whatever party people vote for, things go on pretty much the same
- q23\_3 - people like me have no influence on what the government does
- q23\_4 - the people we elect as members of parliament very quickly lose touch with their voters

### **Xenophobia**

As we already saw in the SIREN project, prejudice against immigrants or "everyday racism" refers to negative attitudes towards foreigners because they are perceived as an (economic or cultural) threat (De Witte 1999). These negative attitudes play a crucial role in ethnic competition theory (Coenders 2001). This theory combines conflict theory (Campbell 1967) and social identification theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Conflict theory states that social groups have conflicting interests because relevant material goods (employment, housing, social security) are scarce. This scarcity promotes competition. As a consequence, autochthonous respondents lacking essential resources develop negative attitudes towards immigrants, which make them susceptible to the appeal of extreme right-wing parties.

From the original SIREN conceptualization we preserved two variables for measuring xenophobia:

- q22\_9 - immigrants increase crime rates in Austria/Hungary
- q22\_10 - immigrants contribute to the welfare of this country

### **Ethnocentrism**

The overwhelming majority of the mentioned sociological and social psychological theories emphasize the importance of workplace experiences, uncertainty and deprivation, the disturbance of collective and individual identity, and the need to rebuild this through imaginary national integration and identification. According to the theory of modernity, atomization and individualization lead to the protection of natural communities in today's Western societies. But the theory of déclasserment, the losers of modernity theory, the theory of social disintegration or the theory of symbolic world all emphasize the threat of the erosion of social identity and,

the demand of symbolic integration into a broader and secure community, as well, which demand can easily lead to ethnocentrism and nationalism.

From the original SIREN conceptualization we preserved two variables for measuring ethnocentrism/nationalism:

- q22\_5 - the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Austrians/Hungarians
- q22\_6 - people should support their country even if the country is wrong

## 7. *SIREN-SOCRIS COMPARISON – RESEARCH FINDINGS*

In this chapter we present which socio-demographic factors influence perceptions of socio-economic changes, and besides, how socio-economic changes affect respondents' feeling of appreciations, social attachments and subjective wellbeing over time. Then we compare employees' value profiles and its explanatory factors by rounds as well. Next, we will show the differences and similarities that can be found in affinities to right wing extremism, and what sociological, socio-psychological phenomena and value profiles characterize these political orientations. First, we analyse the changes in Hungary, then in Austria.

### 7.A. *HUNGARY (SAMPLE OF EMPLOYED FOR MORE THAN 5 YEARS)*

Now, we provide correlation scores between perceptions of changes in amount of work, socio-demographic characteristics and some labour-market variables. As shown in the following table, perceptions in changes of the amount of work have increased significantly more before 2017 than before 2003 in Hungary.

**Table 2.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in amount of work over the last years*

<b>Amount of work</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b> (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)	<b>3,60</b>	<b>3,90</b>	<b>SIG****</b>
Gender	NS	0,12**	
<i>Male</i>	–	<u>3,80</u>	
<i>Female</i>	–	<u>4,00</u>	
Age	-0,14***	NS	
Educational level	NS	0,15***	
Contract*	-0,13**	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>3,70</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>3,30</u>	–	
Sector	NS	0,16***	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	<u>3,80</u>	
<i>Public</i>	–	<u>4,10</u>	
Worksystem*	NS	0,13**	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	<u>3,50</u>	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	<u>3,90</u>	
Occupational position	NS	NS	

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Worksystem\* and contract\* = only for not-self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

The most important bivariate relations with the changes in the amount of work are gender, educational level, worksystem and sector. While these had played no role in the perceptions of changing workloads in 2003, rising workload is observed among female and higher educated respondents, moreover among those working in the public sector or as full time employees in 2017 in Hungary. Age and work contract had a relationship with the changes in the amount of work only in 2003, where younger employed and those with permanent contract experienced a rising workload.

As shown in the next table, there was no change in perceived autonomy in 2017 compared to 2003 in Hungary.

**Table 3.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in amount of autonomy in people's jobs over the last years

<b>Autonomy</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b> (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)	<b>3,22</b>	<b>3,22</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,18***	-0,13**	NS
Educational level	NS	0,12**	
Contract*	-0,13**	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>3.30</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>2.95</u>	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,16***	0,14***	NS

Legend:

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Age is a factor that has a significant relationship with changes in autonomy in both rounds – older people report lower increase than younger people (no significant difference is observed between rounds). The relationship between autonomy and occupational position is significant

in both rounds. Here those with higher occupational positions report higher increases compared to respondents with lower occupational positions.

On the one hand, the factor with a significant effect only in 2017 is educational level. People with higher education report higher increase. Contract-type on the other hand has a significant relationship with autonomy only in 2003. Respondents with permanent contracts experienced a rising autonomy at the workplace.

The next table shows correlations between background variables and perceptions of job security in both rounds in Hungary.

**Table 4.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in job security over the last years.

<b>Job security</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)</b>	<b>2,70</b>	<b>3,10</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,15**	-0,08*	NS
Educational level	NS	NS	
Contract*	-0,10*	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>2,80</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>2,50</u>	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	NS	

Legend:

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Overall there was a significant increase in the perception of changes in job security in 2017 compared to 2003 (significant difference is observed between rounds). However, almost none of the background variables appear to have a role to play in this. In Hungary, age plays a significant role, where older people report lower levels of increase than younger people. Work

contract plays a role only in 2003: those with permanent contracts experienced an increasing job security at the workplace.

As seen in the next table, mean of perceived socio-economic change increased significantly in 2017 compared to 2003 in Hungary.

**Table 5.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived socio-economical change*

<b>SEC index (based on amount of work, autonomy and job security)</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>3,18</b>	<b>3,39</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,22***	-0,12**	NS
Educational level	NS	0,12**	
Contract*	-0,16***	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>-0,07</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	-0,50	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,11**	0,13**	NS

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Age and occupational position play a part, where older people and those with lower occupational positions have more negative views on the perceived socio-economic changes in both rounds. Educational level has a significant relationship with perceptions of socio-economic changes only in 2017: higher educated people have more positive views on the subject. Finally, work contract plays a role only in 2003: those with permanent contracts experienced more positive socio-economic changes.

As indicated in the next table, subjective wellbeing increased slightly in the investigated period, the difference between SIREN (2003) and SOCRIS (2017) times concerning feelings of wellbeing, however, is significant.



**Table 6.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the subjective wellbeing

Subjective wellbeing (Principal component - PC)	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
Mean	<b>-0,08</b>	<b>0,08</b>	<b>SIG**</b>
Gender	-0,13**	-0,09*	NS
<i>Male</i>	<u>0,04</u>	<u>0,17</u>	
<i>Female</i>	-0,02	-0,01	
Age	-0,12**	-0,25***	NS
Educational level	0,16***	0,21***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,18***	0,22***	NS
SEC	0,34***	0,36***	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Perceptions of socio-economic changes appear to have the strongest relationship with subjective wellbeing in both rounds where positive perceptions of changes go together with positive accounts of subjective wellbeing (no significant difference is to be observed between SIREN and SOCRIS). Occupational position is also relevant here – people with higher occupational positions report more positive subjective wellbeing in both rounds (again, no significant difference is observed between SIREN and SOCRIS).

Education also has a significant relationship with subjective wellbeing in both rounds. People with higher education level report an increase in subjective wellbeing. Age has a role to play as well: older people report worse levels of subjective wellbeing than younger people. The relationship between gender and subjective wellbeing follows a similar pattern in both rounds: both in SIREN (2003) and SOCRIS (2017) the increase is higher among men (no significant difference is observed concerning age, gender or educational level between rounds). Neither contract-type, nor sector or work system appear to be relevant for subjective wellbeing.

As illustrated in table 7, in comparison to 2003, people feel significantly less identified socially with certain social groups in 2017.

**Table 7. Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the integration**

<b>Social attachment (PC)</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,14</b>	<b>-0,15</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	0,19***	0,11**	NS
Educational level	NS	0,12**	
Contract*	-0,09*	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>0,18</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>-0,08</u>	–	
Sector	NS	0,12**	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	-0,26	
<i>Public</i>	–	<u>-0,01</u>	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	0,16***	
SEC	0,17***	0,16***	NS
Subjective wellbeing	NS	0,14**	

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

The most important bivariate relationships with feelings of social attachment are the variables of age and perceptions of socio-economic changes. In general, older people report higher levels of social identification than younger people. People who have more positive perceptions of socio-economic changes also report higher levels of social attachment. The same is true of subjective wellbeing, but only in 2017. Educational level is also only significant in 2017: people with higher educational levels appear to be more attached. Contract type is significant only in 2003: those with permanent employment report higher level of social attachment. Sector only appears to play a role in 2017: workers of the public sector in general report higher levels of social attachment than workers of the private sector. Occupational position is significant in

2017: the higher one's occupational position, the more attached they will feel. Interestingly, work system does not play a role in feelings of social attachment in either of the rounds.

As shown in table 8, feelings of collective relative deprivation (CRD) had not changed in general comparing times before and after the socio-economic crises of 2008 (the difference is not significant).

**Table 8.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the appreciation

<b>Appreciation/deprivation (PC)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>-0,04</b>	<b>0,04</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	-0,16***	
Educational level	NS	0,08*	
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	0,13**	
SEC	0,25***	0,21***	NS
Subjective wellbeing	0,33***	0,39***	NS

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Among the background variables subjective wellbeing has the strongest relationship with appreciation in both rounds. Those who report higher levels of subjective wellbeing also report higher levels of appreciation (and so, lower collective relative deprivation). The case is similar to the perception of socio-economic changes: those who report positive socio-economic changes tend to report higher levels of appreciation in both rounds.

Interestingly, occupational position has no significant relationship with feelings of appreciation in 2003. However, in 2017 those in higher occupational positions report higher levels of appreciation. Neither contract-type nor sector or work system have a relationship with appreciation in any of the rounds. Educational level on the other hand plays a role only in 2017 where people with higher levels of education report higher levels of appreciation. Age is relevant only in 2017 as well: older people report lower levels of appreciation than younger respondents.

As demonstrated in table 9, SDO tends towards the negative in Hungary in the investigated period (the difference is highly significant).

**Table 9.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on SDO

SDO (Index)	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,95</b>	<b>2,55</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	-0,15***	
Educational level	-0,28***	-0,17***	SIG
Contract*	NS	0,10*	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	2,50	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	<u>2.80</u>	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,12**	-0,16***	NS
SEC	0,09*	0,12**	NS
Subjective wellbeing	NS	NS	
Social attachment	0,11**	NS	
Appreciation	0,22***	0,19***	NS

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

People with higher educational levels are less inclined to hold the attitude of social dominance orientation. Age is relevant in 2017 only, where older people are less likely to hold SDO than younger people. Contract-type seems to be important in 2017 only where permanent workers are more declined to have SDO than fixed-term labourers. Neither sector, nor work system or subjective wellbeing appear to have a relationship with SDO. The perception of socio-economic changes on the other hand is a factor in both rounds where winners of changes are more prone to SDO than part-losers. Deprivation also plays an important role in both rounds: the more feeling of deprivation the more affinity to SDO. Occupational position is relevant in both rounds, too – the higher one’s position on the occupational ladder the least inclined they are to hold SDO. Interestingly, feelings of social attachment are positively correlated with SDO in 2003, while no effect can be observed in 2017.

As we presented in table 10, authoritarianism tends towards the negative in Hungary in 2017, too (the difference is highly significant).

**Table 10.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on authoritarianism

<b>Authoritarianism (PC)</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,11</b>	<b>-0,12</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,24***	-0,25***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	0,12**	0,11**	NS
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	<u>0,00</u>	<u>-0,24</u>	
<i>Public</i>	<u>0,22</u>	<u>-0,01</u>	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,13**	-0,23***	NS
SEC	0,09*	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	NS	NS	
Social attachment	0,09*	0,19***	NS
Appreciation	0,14***	NS	

Legend:

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Educational level is strongly negatively correlated to authoritarianism in both rounds, more highly educated people hold less authoritarian views. The same applies to occupational position. Sector is also relevant here in both rounds: people working in the private sector are less authoritarian than public sector employees. Curiously, social attachment is positively related to authoritarianism in Hungary. Feelings of appreciation and perceptions of socio-economic changes played roles only in 2003, where the more appreciated and the winners inclined to be more authoritarian. Nevertheless, neither gender, age, work system, contract nor subjective wellbeing seem to play a role here.

As we see in table 11, in general, level of xenophobia became significantly higher in 2017 than in 2003.

**Table 11.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on xenophobia

<b>Xenophobia (Index)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>3,50</b>	<b>3,70</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,26***	-0,16***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	0,13**	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	<u>3,60</u>	
<i>Public</i>	–	<u>3,80</u>	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	-0,13**	
SEC	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	-0,12**	NS	
Social attachment	NS	NS	
Appreciation	-0,11**	NS	

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

People with higher educational levels are less xenophobic than people with lower educational levels in both rounds. The higher one's position on the occupational ladder, the less xenophobic they will be in 2017.

Sector is important in 2017 only: people in the private sector are less xenophobic than those employed in the public sector. Subjective wellbeing and perceptions of appreciation are related to xenophobia only in 2003: people who report better subjective wellbeing or more appreciation are more tolerant (less xenophobic). Social attachment, socio-economic changes, gender, age, work system or contract type do not affect tolerance/xenophobia.

As seen in table 12, in general, level of ethnocentrism is significant lower in 2017 than in 2003 in Hungary.

**Table 12.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on ethnocentrism

<b>Ethnocentrism (Index)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,90</b>	<b>2,70</b>	<b>SIG****</b>
Gender	NS	-0,10*	
<i>Male</i>	–	<u>2,80</u>	
<i>Female</i>	–	<u>2,60</u>	
Age	0,13**	NS	
Educational level	-0,15****	-0,14****	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	0,12**	0,10*	NS
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	<u>2,80</u>	<u>2,60</u>	
<i>Public</i>	<u>3,00</u>	<u>2,80</u>	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,12**	-0,13**	NS
SEC	0,10*	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	NS	0,12**	
Social attachment	0,19****	0,21****	NS
Appreciation	0,13**	0,14**	NS

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Most background variables are related to ethnocentrism, in at least one of the rounds, except for work system and contracts. Similarly to xenophobia, educational level and occupational position are strongly related to ethnocentrism. The higher one's occupational position or educational level, the least prone to ethnocentrism they are. Feelings of social attachment and appreciation, however, are positively related to ethnocentrism.

Gender's relationship to ethnocentrism is relevant in 2017 only: women are less ethnocentric than men. Age, on the other hand, is important in 2003, when older people are more ethnocentric than younger people.

Sector is relevant also in both rounds: people employed in the public sector are more ethnocentric than those working in the private sector. The perception of socio-economic changes is important in 2003 only: winners were then more ethnocentric. Finally, subjective wellbeing is positively related to ethnocentrism only in 2017: those who report better subjective wellbeing are more ethnocentric.

As reflected in table 13, in Hungary, the level of political powerlessness is significantly lower in 2017 than in 2003, however, the difference is not too large.

**Table 13.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on political powerlessness*

<b>Political Powerlessness (PC)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,10</b>	<b>-0,10</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,14***	-0,12**	NS
Contract*	NS	0,10*	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	-0,11	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	<u>0,25</u>	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,11**	-0,18***	NS
SEC	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	-0,22***	-0,29***	NS
Social attachment	NS	-0,10*	
Appreciation	-0,11**	-0,30***	SIG



Legend:\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

The most important relationship with political powerlessness comes from feelings of appreciation and subjective wellbeing. The more appreciated or more wellbeing one feels the less powerlessness they perceive: i.e. political powerlessness correlated positively with collective relative deprivation (*in a significant growing extent*) and lack of wellbeing. Two other important factors appear in both rounds as well: educational level and occupational position. The higher one's occupational position and educational level, the least they experience political powerlessness. Contract is relevant only in 2017, people employed with open ended contracts feel less politically powerless here. Social attachment is inversely related to political powerlessness in 2017 (no correlations are to be observed in 2003). The more attached, the less politically powerless they feel.

As noticed in the next table, affinity to MIÉP was significant lower in 2003 than in 2017 to Jobbik or to the Orbán-government (neither of the scores were high on a 5-point scale, however).

**Table 14.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on RWP affinity

<b>RWP affinity</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	SOCRIS (2017)
<b>MIÉP-JOBBIK-Orbán-gov.</b>	MIÉP	Jobbik	Orbán-gov.
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,30</b>	<b>2,70</b>	<b>2,80</b>
Gender	NS	-0,09*	NS
<i>Male</i>	–	<u>2,80</u>	–
<i>Female</i>	–	2,60	–
Age	-0,15***	-0.13**	NS
Educational level	-0,17***	NS	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	NS
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	–
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	–
Sector	NS	NS	0,15***
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	2,60
<i>Public</i>	–	–	<u>3,00</u>
Work system*	NS	NS	NS
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	–
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	–
Occupational position	-0,12**	-0,15**	0,1*
SEC	0,09*	-0,09*	0,12**
Subjective wellbeing	NS	-0,11*	0,26***
Social attachment	NS	NS	0,20***
Appreciation	NS	-0,14**	0,24***
SDO	0,16***	NS	0,19***
Ethnocentrism	0,10*	NS	0,35***
Xenophobia	0,18***	NS	0,31***
Authoritarianism	0,15***	0,16***	0,29***
Political powerlessness	NS	0,18***	-0,40***

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Affinity to right-wing extremism is positively related to numerous previously discussed factors in 2003, including social dominance orientation, ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia in the case of MIÉP. In the case of Jobbik in 2017, however, only authoritarianism and political powerlessness play important roles among receptiveness attitudes.

Lower educational level is only important in relation with MIÉP affinity, while gender (males), lower subjective wellbeing and deprivation only in the case of Jobbik in 2017. Occupational position and age are all inversely related to RWE affinities: the higher one's occupational position, or is older one is, the less likely they are to share RWP affinity. Perceptions of socio-economic changes have weak positive effects in the case of MIÉP, while weak negative effects in the case of Jobbik.

Much more interesting is the situation by analysing the satisfaction with the Orbán-government as affinity to the new populist far-right in governing position. Employees of the public sector, those with higher occupational positions and more integrated jobholders are more satisfied with the government. What is more, higher subjective status (subjective winner positions, wellbeing, feelings of appreciation) is strongly connected to the government satisfaction. Nevertheless, strong political trust with all of the right wing extremist attitudes (SDO, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and authoritarianism) hand in hand influence the satisfaction with the Orbán-government, positively. Practically, all these factors (with the exception of SDO) can be seen as significant changes in RWP affinity since 2003 and implies the radicalization of subjective winners of the changes.

### **Step by step analyses**

In this subchapter we analyse the effects of the most important influencing factors towards right wing party affinity (RWPA) step by step. It means that we build different, ever expanding explaining models, where the included independent variables hold each other's effects to the given dependent variable under control. The first models always include socio-demographic variables, the second ones include variables relating labour market positions, the third ones the perceptions of socio-economic changes as well, the fourth ones are complemented with socio-psychological drivers and the subjective wellbeing, and finally, the fifth ones with receptiveness attitudes.

First of all, we have to mention that the explanatory powers of the models are very weak in both rounds in cases of MIÉP and Jobbik (which means that the included independent variables slightly explain the affinity to these parties), but rather strong in the case of Orbán-government.

**Table 15.** *Stepwise overall regression on right-wing party affinity*

<b>RW Party Affinity (SIREN 2003) MIÉP</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	-0,16***	-0,17***	-0,16**	-0,15**	-0,12*
Education	-0,18**	-0,15**	-0,16**	-0,16**	NS
Sector (Private/Public)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Work system* (Part- time/Full time)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Occupational position		NS	NS	NS	NS
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS
Subjective wellbeing				NS	NS
Social attachment				NS	NS
Appreciation				NS	NS
Authoritarianism					NS
Political powerlessness					-0,11*
Xenophobia					0,19**
Ethnocentrism					NS
SDO					NS
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0,05	0,05	0,05	0,04	0,07

In the case of MIÉP, age plays a significant role in all models, that is, younger respondents showed more affinity to MIÉP in 2003. Lower education as explanatory factor falls out only from the last model, where xenophobia and political trust explain rather the affinity to MIÉP. No labour-market variables, perceptions of socio-economic changes or socio-psychological drivers played any role in MIÉP affinity.

**Table 16.** Stepwise overall regression on right-wing party affinity

<b>RW Party Affinity (SOCRIS) JOBBIK</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Significan ce level between the two rounds
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	
Age	-0,13**	-0,13**	-0,13**	-0,18**	-0,20***	NS
Education	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	
Sector (Private/Public)		NS	NS	NS	NS	
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS	
Work system* (Part-time/Full time)		NS	NS	NS	NS	
Occupational position		-0,14**	-0,15**	NS	NS	
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing				-0,13*	NS	
Social attachment				NS	NS	
Appreciation				-0,13*	NS	
Authoritarianism					0,21**	
Political powerlessness					NS	
Xenophobia					NS	
Ethnocentrism					NS	
SDO					NS	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0,02	0,03	0,03	0,05	0,08	

In the case of Jobbik, the situation is similar concerning age. Effects of lower occupational position, less subjective wellbeing and deprivation appear in some of the models, but in the final model we find only younger and more authoritarian respondents showing up more affinity to Jobbik. So, perceptions of socio-economic changes do not seem to explain the affinity to these parties in neither of the rounds in Hungary.

Next we provide an overview of the relationship between explanatory variables and satisfaction with the Orbán-government in Hungary.

**Table 17.** Stepwise overall regression on satisfaction with the Orbán-government in Hungary

<b>Orbán-government satisfaction</b>	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Education	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Sector (Private/Public)		0,16**	0,15**	0,13**	NS
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Work system* (Part-time/Full time)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Occupational position		NS	NS	NS	NS
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS
Subjective wellbeing				0,2***	0,15**
Social attachment				0,14**	NS
Appreciation				0,15**	NS
Authoritarianism					0,13*
Political powerlessness					-0,34***SIG
Xenophobia					0,22*** NS
Ethnocentrism					NS
SDO					NS
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	NS	0,02	0,03	0,12	0,34

Socio-demographic variables do not influence the affinity to the Orbán-government, practically sympathizers can be found in all strata of the Hungarian society. Higher occupational positions and workers of the public sector appear in some models, but fall out in the last one. Seemingly, more positive socio-psychological drivers like appreciation, social attachment and feelings of wellbeing influence affinity to the government, in the last model, however, only the effect of the subjective wellbeing remains. Besides wellbeing, strong political trust (*in a significant growing extent*), xenophobia and authoritarianism are the most important factors that explain affinity to the Orbán-government.

**7.B. AUSTRIA**

In the following subchapter we present the Austrian research results. As indicated in table 18, perceptions in changes of the amount of work did not change in 2017 compared to 2003 in Austria.

**Table 18.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in amount of work over the last years*

<b>Amount of work</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b> (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)	<b>3,83</b>	<b>3,84</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	0,08*	
<i>Male</i>	–	<u>3,77</u>	
<i>Female</i>	–	<u>3,92</u>	
Age	0,09*	NS	
Educational level	0,09*	NS	
Contract*	-0,16***	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>3,90</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>3,40</u>	–	
Sector	0,14***	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	<u>3,70</u>	–	
<i>Public</i>	<u>4,00</u>	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,25***	NS	

Legend:\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Interestingly, there is only one effect observed in 2017: women report slightly more increase in the amount of work than men. One of the most important bivariate relation with the changes in the amount of work is the one with the respondent's occupational position in 2003: the higher the position, the bigger increase in the amount of work. Nevertheless, the older, the more educated, public sector workers, and those with permanent work contract report more amount of work in 2003.

As seen in table 19, neither perceptions of autonomy in workplaces changed in 2017 compared to 2003 in Austria.

**Table 19.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in amount of autonomy in people's jobs over the last years*

<b>Autonomy</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b> (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)	<b>3,46</b>	<b>3,38</b>	NS
Gender	-0,09*	NS	
<i>Male</i>	<u>3,55</u>	–	
<i>Female</i>	3,38	–	
Age	-0,21***	-0,18***	NS
Educational level	NS	NS	
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	-0,16***	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	<u>3,50</u>	
<i>Public</i>	–	3,20	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,10**	NS	

**Legend:**

\* =  $p < 0,05$

\*\* =  $p < 0,01$

\*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Men, the younger and those with higher occupational positions reported more autonomy in 2003. In 2017, age is still an important influencing factor (with the same result as in 2003), but sector became also significant: workers of the private sector report more autonomy in their workplaces.

As demonstrated in table 20, feelings of job security significantly changed in 2017 compared to 2003. Respondents report more job security after the crisis of 2008.



**Table 20.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived change in job security over the last years

<b>Job security</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b> (1=much less / 3=same / 5=much more)	<b>2,94</b>	<b>3,13</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,12**	NS	
Educational level	NS	NS	
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	NS	

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

We found only one influencing factor in 2003 influencing job security: younger people reported more job security then. This means, however, that an increasing job security affected practically everyone in the investigated population.

In sum, as illustrated in the next table, investigating the socio-economic change (SEC) index created by the amount of work, autonomy and job security, we can state that this did not change over time in Austria.

**Table 21.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the perceived socio-economical change*

<b>SEC (Index)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>3,40</b>	<b>3,40</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,12**	-0,12**	NS
Educational level	NS	NS	
Contract*	-0,13**	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>3,40</u>	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	3,20	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,22***	NS	

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Only younger people report more positive SEC in 2017, while the younger, those with permanent work contracts and higher occupational positions reported positive SEC in 2003.

As indicated in the next table, subjective wellbeing has significantly improved over time, however.

**Table 22.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the subjective wellbeing

<b>Subjective wellbeing (PC)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>-0,24</b>	<b>0,22</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	-0,22***	-0,15***	NS
Educational level	0,12**	0,12**	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,20***	0,15***	NS
SEC	0,26***	0,30***	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

In both rounds positive SEC, younger age, higher occupational position and education level influence the wellbeing. Changes in these effects, however, are not significant over time.

As we can see in table 23, neither level of social attachment has changed in 2017 compared to 2003 in Austria.

**Table 23.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the integration*

<b>Social attachment (PC)</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	0,13**	0,09**	NS
Educational level	NS	NS	
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	0,10**	
SEC	0,19***	0,21***	NS
Subjective wellbeing	0,12**	0,09*	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

In both rounds older people, those with positive perceptions of SEC, and respondents with subjective wellbeing report to have more social attachment. Occupational position seems to be important only in 2017: the higher the position, the higher the level of social attachment.

As demonstrated in the next table, feelings of appreciation improved significantly over time in Austria.

**Table 24.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on the appreciation*

<b>Appreciation (PC)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>-0,16</b>	<b>0,14</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	NS	0,15***	
Contract*	-0,12**	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	<u>-0,10</u>	NS	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	-0,50	NS	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	0,09*	0,12**	NS
SEC	0,17***	0,11**	NS
Subjective wellbeing	0,30***	0,27***	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

In both rounds those with higher occupational positions, positive perceptions of SEC and respondents with subjective wellbeing report to be more appreciated (no significant differences are observed). Besides, while those with permanent work contracts reported to be more appreciated in 2003, higher educational level became an important influencing factor in 2017.

As indicated in table 25, the level of social dominance orientation significantly declined over time in Austria.

**Table 25.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on SDO*

SDO (Index)	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>3,80</b>	<b>3,10</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	0,10**	
Educational level	NS	-0,15***	
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	-0,09*	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	<u>3,80</u>	–	
<i>Public</i>	<u>3,60</u>	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,09*	NS	
SEC	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	NS	NS	
Social attachment	0,11**	NS	
Appreciation	NS	NS	

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

While in 2003 those with a higher social attachment level and lower occupational position, moreover, workers of the private sector showed more SDO, older and lower educated respondents became more social dominance oriented in 2017.

However, the level of authoritarianism has not changed over time.

**Table 26.** *Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on authoritarianism*

<b>Authoritarianism (PC)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,03</b>	<b>-0,03</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,15***	-0,19***	NS
Contract*	0,18***	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	-0,05	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	<u>0,50</u>	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	0,09*	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	-0,13	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	<u>0,08</u>	
Occupational position	-0,20***	-0,23***	NS
SEC	-0,09*	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	-0,13**	NS	
Social attachment	0,10*	0,11**	NS
Appreciation	NS	NS	

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Lower education, more social attachment and occupational position influence authoritarianism in both rounds (no significant differences between rounds are observed). While negative perceptions of SEC, lower wellbeing and fixed term contract resulted in a higher level of authoritarianism in 2003, full time workers seem to be more authoritarian in 2017.

As seen, neither level of xenophobia has changed in Austria.

**Table 27.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on xenophobia

<b>Xenophobia (Index)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,80</b>	<b>2,80</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	NS	
<i>Male</i>	–	–	
<i>Female</i>	–	–	
Age	0,10**	NS	
Educational level	-0,15***	-0,15***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,14***	-0,14***	NS
SEC	-0,10*	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	-0,18***	-0,13***	NS
Social attachment	NS	NS	
Appreciation	-0,08*	-0,10**	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

A lower level of education, occupational position, appreciation and wellbeing result in more xenophobia in both rounds. Nevertheless, older and those with negative perceptions of SEC showed up higher level of xenophobia in 2003.

As illustrated below, the level of ethnocentrism declined significantly in 2017 compared to 2003 in Austria.



**Table 28.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on ethnocentrism

<b>Ethnocentrism (Index)</b>	<b>SIREN (2003)</b>	<b>SOCRIS (2017)</b>	<b>Significance level between the two rounds</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,80</b>	<b>2,40</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	-0,09*	-0,09*	
<i>Male</i>	<u>2,90</u>	<u>2,50</u>	
<i>Female</i>	2,70	2,30	
Age	0,10**	0,10**	NS
Educational level	NS	-0,15***	
Contract*	NS	0,11*	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	2,50	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	<u>2,90</u>	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	NS	-0,20***	
SEC	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	NS	-0,11**	
Social attachment	NS	0,08*	
Appreciation	NS	NS	

**Legend:**

\* = p&lt;0,05

\*\* = p&lt;0,01

\*\*\* = p&lt;0,001

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

While older and male respondents are characterized with a higher level of ethnocentrism in both rounds, people with lower education, those with fixed term contracts, lower occupational positions and wellbeing tend to be more ethnocentric in 2017. However, more social attachment influenced ethnocentrism also positively in 2017.

Also the level of political powerlessness declined significantly in comparison over time in Austria, as shown in table 29.

**Table 29.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on political powerlessness

<b>Political Powerlessness (PC)</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0,10</b>	<b>-0,09</b>	<b>SIG***</b>
Gender	0,13**	NS	
<i>Male</i>	<i>-0,03</i>	–	
<i>Female</i>	<u>0,22</u>	–	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,08*	-0,22***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	NS	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	–	–	
<i>Public</i>	–	–	
Work system*	NS	NS	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	–	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	–	
Occupational position	-0,11**	-0,13***	NS
SEC	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing	-0,24***	NS	
Social attachment	NS	0,10**	
Appreciation	-0,21***	-0,27***	NS

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Lower levels of education, occupational position and appreciation resulted in more feeling of political powerlessness in both rounds. While female respondents and those with a lower level of subjective wellbeing reported more political powerlessness only in 2003, a higher level of social attachment became a significant explanatory factor in 2017.

The level of FPÖ affinity has not changed significantly over time, however.

**Table 30.** Bivariate effects from the background characteristics on RWE affinity

<b>RWE affinity - FPÖ</b>	SIREN (2003)	SOCRIS (2017)	Significance level between the two rounds
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2,45</b>	<b>2,47</b>	<b>NS</b>
Gender	NS	-0,08*	
<i>Male</i>	–	<u>2,55</u>	
<i>Female</i>	–	2,36	
Age	NS	NS	
Educational level	-0,11**	-0,26***	NS
Contract*	NS	NS	
<i>Permanent (open ended)</i>	–	–	
<i>Fixed term /agency</i>	–	–	
Sector	-0,09*	NS	
<i>Private (with self-empl.)</i>	<u>2,50</u>	–	
<i>Public</i>	2,30	–	
Work system*	NS	0,09*	
<i>Part-time</i>	–	2,20	
<i>Full-time</i>	–	<u>2,50</u>	
Occupational position	-0,08*	-0,14***	NS
SEC	0,11**	0,10*	NS
Subjective wellbeing	-0,10*	NS	
Social attachment	NS	0,18***	
Appreciation	NS	-0,19***	
SDO	0,14***	0,22***	NS
Ethnocentrism	0,16***	0,22***	NS
Xenophobia	0,23***	0,41***	SIG
Authoritarianism	0,29***	0,30***	NS
Political powerlessness	0,26***	0,41***	SIG

**Legend:**\* =  $p < 0,05$ \*\* =  $p < 0,01$ \*\*\* =  $p < 0,001$ 

Work system\* and contract\* = only for not self employed

Maximum category values (within rounds) underlined

Lower levels of education and occupational position, positive SEC (winners of changes), moreover all five receptiveness attitudes (SDO, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, authoritarianism and political powerlessness) play significant roles in the explanation of affinity to FPÖ in both rounds. Xenophobia and political powerlessness affect significantly stronger the FPÖ affinity in 2017 compared to 2003, however. While those with lower subjective wellbeing and employees of the private sector favoured more the FPÖ in 2003, male, full time employees and

those with higher level of social attachment, but also more deprived (less appreciated) respondents felt more inclined to FPÖ in 2017.

In Austria, we found a rather weak explanatory power of the models explaining RWE party affinity in 2003, however, the final explanatory power is much stronger in 2017, as indicated in step by step models shown in tables 31 and 32.

**Table 31.** Stepwise overall regression on right-wing party affinity in 2003

<b>RW Party Affinity (SIREN 2003) FPÖ</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Education	-0,11**	-0.10*	NS	NS	NS
Sector (Private/Public)		-0.10*	NS	NS	NS
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS
Work system* (Part-time/Full time)		NS	NS	NS	-0,10*
Occupational position		NS	NS	NS	NS
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS
Subjective wellbeing				-0,12*	NS
Social attachment				NS	NS
Appreciation				NS	NS
Authoritarianism					0,25***
Political powerlessness					0,17***
Xenophobia					0,10*
Ethnocentrism					NS
SDO					NS
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0,01	0,02	0,01	0,02	0,14

In Austria, weak effects of education and sector disappear for the third model and we find only part-time employees, more authoritarian, xenophobic and politically powerless respondents among the explanatory variables of RWE party affinity at the end in 2003. So, only some insecure labour market situation and receptiveness attitudes seem to explain the FPÖ affinity at that time in Austria.

**Table 32.** Stepwise overall regression on right-wing party affinity in 2017

<b>RW Party Affinity (SOCRIS 2017) FPÖ</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Signifi- cance level
Gender (Male, Female)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	
Age	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	
Education	-0,26***	-0,24***	-0,24***	-0,23***	-0,12*	NS
Sector (Private/Public)		NS	NS	NS	NS	
Contract* (Permanent/Fixed term)		NS	NS	NS	NS	
Work system* (Part-time/Full time)		0,11*	0,12*	0,12*	NS	
Occupational position		NS	NS	NS	NS	
SEC Index			NS	NS	NS	
Subjective wellbeing				NS	NS	
Social attachment				0,17***	0,17***	
Appreciation				-0,10*	NS	
Authoritarianism					NS	
Political powerlessness					0,21***	NS
Xenophobia					0,35***	SIG
Ethnocentrism					NS	
SDO					NS	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0,07	0,08	0,07	0,10	0,31	

In 2017, in explanation of FPÖ affinity, while a social status variable like educational level plays an important role throughout the models, labour market variables or the perception of socio-economic changes have no effect in the final model (full time employees, however, seem to be more inclined to FPÖ affinity). Besides political powerlessness and xenophobia (which became significantly the strongest variable in the explanation of FPÖ affinity) more social attachment also strengthens RWE party affinity.


In sum, while neither status, nor socio-psychological variables or effects of SEC, and also only a weak labour market effect and some receptiveness attitudes influenced the FPÖ affinity in 2003 in Austria, education, social attachment, political disappointment, and first of all xenophobia became important as explanatory variables in 2017, while authoritarianism lost its impact.

In neither of the rounds were found direct effects of perceptions of socio-economic changes to right wing extremism in Austria and Hungary, though. But maybe we can discover latent effects of SEC behind RWE party affinity by using linear regression chain-models, so called path analyses, however.

### Path-models

Path models are linear regression chains, where the correlation between two variables is broken up to different routes. Based on the idea and methodology used in the international SIREN project (2003), we have worked out country-specific path models for both rounds in Austria and Hungary separately. In the followings, we present five path models, where the correlations between the perceptions of socio-economic changes and RWE party affinity are broken up to so called “winner and loser” routes. We built path models in both countries, since we wanted to investigate the latent effects of socio-economic changes across socio-psychological drivers and receptiveness attitudes to affinity to MIÉP, Jobbik, the Orbán-government and FPÖ.


*Figure 3. MIÉP 2003*



In case of MIÉP, winner routes lead via social attachment firstly to ethnocentrism according to 2003 data. This means that those who perceive positive changes in their socio-economic situations can also feel more attached in the society which can lead to the ethnocentric view of Hungary (Hungary is better than other countries; people should be more like Hungarians etc.). This winner route leads then through social dominance orientation (feeling of supremacy, like some people are inferior to others, support of hierarchy) to xenophobia and to MIÉP affinity on the one hand, and across authoritarianism (supporting law and order, strong leadership and aggression towards non-conventionalists) also to xenophobia and MIÉP affinity on the other hand. The same dynamics can be observed via appreciation (lack of deprivation) to ethnocentrism and then on the above described routes to the MIÉP.

Loser routes start at the perception of negative changes in one's socio-economic situations which lead to feeling of deprivation and injustice that either via political powerlessness or directly end up in xenophobia and then to MIÉP affinity.

*Figure 4. Jobbik 2017*




In the case of Jobbik in 2017, we can observe partly different dynamics in the path model. First, not xenophobia, but authoritarianism and political powerlessness correlate directly with the affinity to Jobbik. Secondly, xenophobia plays only on a loser route an indirect role (due to the xenophobic politics of the Orbán-government, which took the wind out of the sail of Jobbik, see Figure 5). Social attachment is furthermore an important driver of the winner routes: it leads either across ethnocentrism, or directly, to the attitude of authoritarianism, which gets then to an affinity to Jobbik. The other winner-route-driver is the feeling of appreciation (lack of deprivation). This leads to SDO on the one hand, and to ethnocentrism on the other hand, and these either via authoritarianism or via SDO through political powerlessness to Jobbik affinity.

Beside the already mentioned loser route via xenophobia, there is a more important one: negative SEC via deprivation leads to the feeling of political powerlessness and this further to the affinity to Jobbik.

For checking the above mentioned phenomenon that by its radicalized rhetoric Fidesz practically could steal buzzwords and voters from Jobbik, we can draw up a further path-model here, this time investigating routes to affinity to the Orbán-government. As we can state, ethnocentrism and xenophobia beside strong political trust are the most important factors, which explain the affinity to the Orbán-government in 2017 in Hungary. But the most interesting phenomenon here is that there are no loser routes leading to the affinity to the


government. What’s more, not only social attachment and authoritarianism play an important driver-role here, but also appreciation (lack of deprivation) via SDO lead to ethnocentrism and through this attitude, to affinity to the government. Interestingly, there is a direct winner route observed from SEC to affinity to the Orbán-government as well which indicates that it is enough to be a subjective winner of the changes to support a far-right populist government without any ideological munition.

**Figure 5. Satisfaction with the Orbán-government 2017**



In the case of FPÖ in Austria in 2003 a coherent ideological basis can be observed, which leads to FPÖ affinity with the help of social attachment and ethnocentrism on the winner route.

**Figure 6. FPÖ 2003**




Winner perceptions lead to more social attachment feelings, which leads, through ethnocentrism, to all other investigated receptiveness attitudes (SDO, xenophobia,



authoritarianism and political powerlessness). These are then directly connected to affinity to FPÖ. Loser routes can lead from negative perceptions of SEC either 1) to xenophobia, or 2) to authoritarianism, or 3) to political powerlessness, directly, which – as we saw – lead to FPÖ affinity. There are two more loser routes driven by deprivation: one leads through authoritarianism, and another one via political powerlessness to affinity to the FPÖ.

**Figure 7. FPÖ 2017**



The picture partly changed in 2017 compared to 2003 in Austria. Deprivation is still an important driver on the loser routes: on the one hand, deprivation leads to FPÖ affinity directly, on the other hand, it gets with the intermediate role of political powerlessness to FPÖ affinity, too. Surprisingly, the feeling of social attachment leads not only to ethnocentrism like 14 years before, but also to authoritarianism, political powerlessness and FPÖ affinity directly as well. These routes show a completely new phenomenon. Until now, political powerlessness always belonged to loser routes only, while social attachment never led directly to RWE party affinity. While SDO furthermore belongs to a winner route, xenophobia lost its connections to loser routes, but became the most important explanatory variable beside political powerlessness. This is a sign of disappointment and the radicalization of the winners: social attachment and all the five receptiveness attitudes belong in different combinations to winner routes, while practically one main loser route remained leading to FPÖ affinity in 2017 in Austria.

### 7.C. Summary and conclusions

#### Country conclusions – Hungary

In sum, perceptions of socio-economic changes have improved over time in Hungary: this is most probably due to the fact that the financial crisis of 2008 and its effects on the labour market (moreover its consequences on the social and political field) hit the employees more heavily and deeply than the neoliberal changes on the labour market in the late 90s/early 2000s. Younger employees and those with a higher status are the *subjective* winners of changes. Although the level of subjective wellbeing has slightly grown, Hungarian employees (particularly compared to their Austrian colleagues) still report huge feelings of deprivation, lack of appreciation and injustice, very similarly to the year of 2003. Again, only younger employees and those with a higher status (and *subjective* winners of changes) reported higher level of appreciation and wellbeing. What's more, *younger age and higher status are new explanatory phenomena concerning appreciation*, which strengthens the winner feelings of these groups on the labour market. But social attachment – and, through this, the general integration level on the labour market – became weaker for the majority of employees than earlier. Subjective losers of the changes and younger employees reported less social attachment. But *employees with a higher status, moreover workers of the public sector have become more integrated (socially attached) on the labour market* than in 2003. All these point out a serious polarization tendency on the labour market in Hungary.

Surprisingly, the degrees of almost all receptiveness attitudes have decreased between 2003 and 2017 in Hungary. But it is important to emphasize here that the only attitude which has skyrocketed in the country over time is xenophobia. The second wave of the financial crisis of 2012 had a significant effect on xenophobia as we know from the results of ESS data from 2012 and 2014 (own calculation). This growing tendency was seriously strengthened due to the radical political reactions of the right wing parties to the so called refugee crisis of 2015, which caused a kind of moral panic in the society and benefited first of all Orbán and his party, as we saw from the comparison of the 2014 and 2016 ESS data (own calculation). However, labour market variables have not shown any correlation with growing xenophobia between 2014 and 2016 in neither of the countries (own calculation).

Nevertheless, we found that belonging to disadvantaged social groups can clearly be a seed-bad of receptiveness attitudes. Employees with lower social status (lower education and occupational position) are more inclined to show more SDO, authoritarianism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism or political powerlessness, while lower subjective status (deprivation and less subjective wellbeing) correlates “only” with political powerlessness in Hungary. *Employees having fixed term contracts have become more social dominance oriented and politically powerless* after the crises. According to the literature, this is a normal pathological reaction of the loser of the changes (Mudde 2010). Deprived persons working among precarious conditions or living among disadvantageous circumstances can feel discriminated and be easily disappointed with the ruling regime and lose trust in the mainstream political forces.

Lower status, however, can lead to the other above mentioned receptiveness attitudes as well. Ethnocentrism plays a status-compensative role as imaginary integration into the nation, whose “natural” superiority as “community of the majority” is unquestionable (Anderson 2006). SDO

appears as a moral superiority feeling along a double demarcation logic against the unmerited corrupt elite “up there” on the one hand and, against the “lazy scroungers” downwards on the other hand. Authoritarianism is a tool to punish people violating conventions, and restoring order by creating dominance of the “merited” in the society, while xenophobia is partly a consequence of the fear of insecurity, (ethnic) competition for jobs and for social benefits (Lipset 1966) and it partly embodies the general out-group rejection resulting from the above mentioned receptiveness attitudes.

But also groups being in a more advantaged situation are threatened by radicalization in Hungary: younger employees, subjective winner groups, appreciated employees or those who reported more subjective wellbeing are more social dominance oriented and show a higher degree of ethnocentrism: positive subjective status can lead to a higher level of SDO and ethnocentrism by emphasizing meritocratic views and defending the status quo and the ethnic community: the ruling power and the integrity of the virtuous and superior national majority (Flecker 2007).

Besides, employees of the public sector are clearly radicalized in Hungary as well: they seem to be more ‘integrated’ on the labour market, but also are more ethnocentric and authoritarian and *xenophobic in a growing extent* (more than in 2003) than employees of the private sector. The question is whether this radicalization process could be explained by a kind of feudal constraints enforced by the government and fear of job loss, high level of conformism (self-surrender or loyalty without criticism), justification of the new order or even the classic authoritarian subjection in the public sector? We still don’t know it surely; this is a question of further research.

As we know, right wing radicalization in the sense of supporting far-right parties is rather a complicated phenomenon in Hungary, since Fidesz and the Orbán-government partly occupied the far-right position in the political field. All in all, the *affinity to right wing populism and extremism became significantly stronger since 2003*, be it about Fidesz or Jobbik. Jobbik has supporters rather from the younger, deprived, disappointed authoritarian block, while Orbán from the xenophobic *high-subjective-status*-holder block having strong trust in him and his charisma. But, socio-demographic variables do not influence the affinity either to Jobbik or the Orbán-government: far-right sympathizers can be found practically in all strata of the Hungarian society.

Nevertheless, based on our step by step models, perceptions of changes do not seem to influence these affinities, directly.

Therefore, by using path models for analysing latent effects of perceptions of SEC it is to be stated that Orbán addressed first of all the *subjective* winners of his regime successfully: there are *exclusively winner routes* that lead to the satisfaction with the Orbán-government among employees. In this model subjective (probably felt as merited) winner positions combined with strong workplace integration and with an authoritarian organization of work and authoritarian demand keeping up winner workplace positions are to be explored as socio-psychological drivers that lead to overheated ethnocentrism/nationalism and out-group rejection (xenophobia), which meet the most important populist buzzwords of the Orbán-government on the one hand. On the other hand, the appreciation in the workplace via the meritocratic and

superior character of SDO gives the feeling to the *subjective* winners of the regime that Hungary is one of the best countries of the world that should be defended at any costs (ethno-nationalism). Besides, appreciation via superiority feeling as support of the just hierarchy leads to the unquestionable trust in the Orbánian world as well. What's more, there is a direct winner route leading from SEC to satisfaction with the Orbán-government without any right wing ideological influence, which clearly shows that a winner perception is well enough to support a far-right political force in a governing position. Nevertheless, this model shows a much stronger explanatory power than that of MIÉP or Jobbik, i.e. these observations are the most valid among the investigations done in Hungary.

Analysing the Jobbik path model in 2017, we can observe only an indirect effect of xenophobia in explanation of affinity to Jobbik, due perhaps to the Orbánian politics. In contrast to the path model leading to satisfaction with the Orbán-government, xenophobia and political powerlessness characterize loser routes in the case of Jobbik. All other receptiveness attitudes characterize the subjective winners of changes. However, among people with a higher perceptions of SEC, Jobbik can only rely on a small, dissatisfied radical group that has either been originally authoritarian, or has become authoritarian through SDO, xenophobia or ethnocentrism: but they are easily to sniff away by Fidesz. Moreover – as mentioned – the explanatory power of this model is much weaker than that of the Orbán-government.

This shows fatal divisions of employee groups in Hungary: there can be observed 1) a radicalized subjective winner group supporting the governing coalition, 2) a much smaller radicalized loser group (with some disappointed radicalized winners arm-in-arm) supporting an even more disappearing far-right opposition party, and 3) all other disappointed and still not radicalized groups being in minority position.

All in all, there is a wide permeation of right-wing radicalism among different social strata in Hungary, most probably due to the hard experiences of the multiple socio-economic political and moral crises of 2008-2012 among the majority of employees and to the moral panic after the so called refugee crisis in 2015. This does not mean, however, that RWE attitudes would *generally* have become stronger after the crisis: what is more, most of them have become somewhat weaker on the average compared to 2003. But the already high level of xenophobia and the affinity to far-right parties have grown, significantly. According to the ESS 2016 data, the largest level of xenophobia is to be observed in Hungary compared to the investigated European countries (own calculation). In sum, in all social strata people received enough far-right attitudinal and ideological scapegoating munition from Fidesz and Jobbik to create a radicalized majority against the left-liberal political forces. Nevertheless, the majority of subjective winners are clearly convinced that the recovery from the crises is only due to the Orbánian governance. The picture is even clearer if we take into consideration that the far-right (Fidesz and Jobbik together) includes more than two thirds of the active voters in Hungary. Practically, the far-right political ideology is common ground also in the world of work today in Hungary.

### Country conclusions - Austria

All in all, in Austria the rather high level of social attachment/labour market integration and positive perceptions of SEC did not change between 2003 and 2017, but levels of subjective wellbeing and appreciation have increased strongly. Neither degrees of xenophobia nor authoritarianism, nor FPÖ affinity have changed over time, while levels of ethnocentrism, political powerlessness and SDO have decreased significantly (this latter is still much higher than the Hungarian one, however).

Similarly to Hungary, younger employees percept more positive SEC, while more subjective wellbeing characterize younger employees, those with higher status and winners of changes. Older respondents and winners of changes reported more social attachment. Subjective wellbeing and winner positions play important roles in feelings of appreciation and, *higher status has also become a significant explanatory variable of appreciation* in 2017, which shows a more intensive polarization trend on the Austrian labour market as well.

Lower status is a seed-bad of receptiveness attitudes in Austria, too: employees with lower status are more inclined to show more SDO, authoritarianism, xenophobia, *ethnocentrism* (this one in growing extent) or political powerlessness. More social attachment correlates with more authoritarianism, while more deprivation correlates with more xenophobia and political powerlessness here. *More social attachment, however, is a new influencing factor in political powerlessness* in 2017. Men and older employees were more inclined to be more ethnocentric in Austria in both rounds. *But people reported less wellbeing and employees with fixed term contracts have become more ethnocentric* in 2017 too, while *older employees have become more inclined to SDO* in a growing extent. Besides, *full time employees showed more authoritarianism* in 2017.

According to the results of *bivariate* analyses, FPÖ affinity can be characterized by *more support of men*, moreover by *deprivation*, but at the same time also by *winner positions, full-time work-system and more social attachment in a growing extent since 2003*. Moreover, FPÖ affinity is correlated with lower social status and all receptiveness RWE attitudes, like xenophobia, political powerlessness, authoritarianism, SDO and ethnocentrism in both rounds. What's more, the *effect of xenophobia* on FPÖ affinity *increased* significantly over time. But similarly to Hungary, we should not forget the probably most important impact concerning the rise of xenophobia in explanation RWPA: the so called refugee crisis in 2015.

However, in the step by step final model only the effects of a lower degree of education, more social attachment, political powerlessness and xenophobia remained in the explanation of FPÖ affinity. Still signs of both winner and loser routes seem to appear in the explanations of FPÖ affinity and, FPÖ supporters seem to be recruited more frequently from groups working as full time employees. But in Austria we did not find a direct effect of perceptions of SEC on FPÖ affinity in either of the rounds when socio-demographic variables were controlled.

Analysing the FPÖ path models as indirect, latent routes of radicalization from perceptions of SEC to FPÖ affinity (without controlling socio-demographic variables), we found that the most important changes in Austria in 2017 compared to 2003 is that winner routes, mostly with the intermediate role of social attachment, get 1) directly, and also via 2) political disappointment,

3) SDO or 4) xenophobia to affinity to the FPÖ. This shows the strengthening relative weight of winner routes in the radicalization process.

However, there are interesting changes on the loser routes as well. Collective relative deprivation (CRD) and political powerlessness lead to FPÖ on loser routes, what's more, CRD takes a direct effect on FPÖ affinity in 2017. What makes the Austrian situation especially interesting is the attachment of people of both winner and loser positions through workplace integration on the winner route or via deprivation on the loser route to FPÖ affinity, directly. They do not need (or they hide) the acceptance of the radical far-right ideology like in 2003. And, as if the earlier strong and coherent attitudinal basis behind FPÖ affinity would rather be loosened, too. This is hard to explain based on our results. It might be because of employees' dissatisfaction with the traditional party system and politics (political powerlessness), or employees wish - in a larger extent and a broader society based - for a new style political life for Austria and FPÖ makes them believe in this.

What's more, the explanatory power of the model is much stronger in 2017 than in 2003, i.e. the observed tendencies and routes are more valid and show more widespread acceptance of FPÖ politics than before the crisis of 2008.

### **Comparing country results and answering research questions**

Answering our first question, employees in Austria showed a higher level of feeling of subjective wellbeing and more positive perceptions of SEC, moreover, a lower level of political powerlessness and ethnocentrism both in 2003 and 2017 rounds than their Hungarian colleagues, but the differences were not too large between countries. Much bigger differences are observed concerning the levels of appreciation, social attachment, authoritarianism and xenophobia: more social attachment and appreciation, moreover, less authoritarianism and xenophobia characterized the employees of Austria in both rounds. The level of SDO, however, was significantly lower in both rounds in Hungary.

Answering our second question, **perceptions of socio-economic changes** increased positively over time in Hungary, while no change can be observed concerning SEC in Austria (its absolute level is similar in 2017 in both countries). As already mentioned, it is probably due to the fact that the crisis that started in 2008 hit Hungary much more than Austria, where the perceptions of changes were very similar in both phases. The level of **subjective wellbeing** increased in both countries in 2017 compared to 2003, however, in a larger extent in Austria. This means that the employees' assessments of their subjective status is better after the crisis of 2008 than before in both countries. The feelings of **appreciation (the opposite of collective relative deprivation, CRD)** has not changed over time in Hungary, while it has significantly increased in Austria. So, the more positive perceptions of SEC do not mean automatically that employees in Hungary would feel more appreciation in the workplaces in a larger extent. This is strengthened by the fact that the level of **social attachment**, and so integrative tendencies, decreased over time in Hungary, while no change can be observed in Austria.

**In sum**, in Austria the levels of labour market integration (attachment), feelings of appreciation and the wellbeing of employees are stronger than in Hungary, so, Austrian employees are

clearly winners - in the sense of showing higher and more stable subjective status - compared to their Hungarian colleagues.

Interestingly, the levels of almost all **receptiveness attitudes** decreased over time in both countries (**SDO** and **ethnocentrism** in a larger extent in Austria than in Hungary) with the exception of xenophobia, which significantly increased between 2003 and 2017 in Hungary (the levels of authoritarianism and xenophobia did not change in Austria). It partly indicates that the crises of 2008 and 2015 had small or even inverse effects on several receptiveness attitudes in both countries, but a large increasing effect on the xenophobia in Hungary.

However, answering our third (and partly the fourth questions too), perceptions of SEC do not seem to influence *directly* receptiveness attitudes or political orientations in either of the countries and rounds (or the effects are rather weak) in particular, when socio-demographic and labour market variables are under control. This means that we have no clear-cut evidence that *perceptions of changes* on the labour market caused by the crisis that started in 2008 would affect *directly and to significantly growing extent* political orientations of employees in Austria and Hungary and, in addition, the suspected effects of the so called refugee crisis also confuse the picture. In right-wing radicalization, besides receptiveness attitudes, we see rather growing effects of subjective status (wellbeing, social attachment and appreciation), full time work-system and labour market attachments (FPÖ) or the public sector (Orbán-government). Fixed term contracts seem to be playing an even more intensive role in SDO and political powerlessness in Hungary, and in ethnocentrism in Austria. However, these labour market effects are not too outstanding.

Although, there can be observed some latent, underlying tendencies in both countries connected (mostly via different socio-psychological drivers) to socio-economic changes. This is important, since we wanted to present the dynamics of the far-right radicalization processes and demonstrate possible ways of thinking and socio-psychological routes (using only cognitive and attitudinal variables) from the perceptions of socio-economic changes to right wing party affinity (regardless of the influence of “hard” background factors like socio-demographic and labour market variables).

Answering our further (5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup>) questions, in Austria winner routes clearly dominate the political radicalization process, be it attitudinal one or linked to party affinity. Political powerlessness, xenophobia and also SDO in some extent are the dominant attitudes on the routes to FPÖ in 2017, but only distrust in politics belong to both winner and loser routes, surprisingly, which shows a rather general disappointment from mainstream politics in Austria. All other attitudes (SDO, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and authoritarianism) strengthen winner routes. What’s more, the effect of xenophobia on FPÖ affinity (that belongs only to the winner route after the crisis) is significantly stronger in 2017 than in 2003. All these developments could meet the xenophobic, racist and anti-mainstream political slogans of the FPÖ which could play very important roles in the success of FPÖ at the 2017 elections.

In Hungary, as mentioned, the situation is more complicated. The Orbán-government and the Fidesz – as a new player on the far-right populist political field – addressed practically the subjective winners of changes among employees successfully. It is reflected by the fact that employees who strongly support Fidesz are the subjective winners of the far-right governance

(regardless of sex, age, and social status) and only winner routes lead to the satisfaction with the Orbán-government. Nevertheless, Fidesz seems to occupy the majority of the far-right political field via its radical right buzzwords, xenophobia and ethnocentrism directly, while SDO and authoritarianism as important drivers, indirectly influence affinity to the Orbán-government. Nevertheless, as presented, subjective winners are dearly inclined to support a far-right government directly, without any ideological impulse.

Thus, we can state, when far-right politics gets into governmental position, which also means it is widely supported by voters like in the case of Fidesz, socio-psychological demarcation lines are more manifest. Those who consider themselves as winners are attached to the Orbán-government, and, considering the election results, it covers a significant social group in various segments of the social hierarchy. At the same time, receptiveness attitudes (authoritarianism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism) demonstrate that the ideological narrative of Fidesz finds its audience in the wider society, associated by political trust: all this is based first of all on the image of the common national enemy, namely the migrant and refugee that only Fidesz and a strong handed leadership can save the Hungarian nation from.

Although Jobbik could address both disappointed winners and losers with the help of different dominance of attitudes, Jobbik affinity, however, is not to be explained by a strong explanatory-power-characterized path-model. This shows that these routes and attitudes (even more) characterize sympathizers of other parties as well (first of all sympathizers of Fidesz). In the case of Jobbik, neither socio-demographic differences, nor receptiveness attitudes play an important part in who is attracted to or rejects its extreme right ideology. Voters of Jobbik as a minority, can be found in each segment of the society without a strong ideological or social basis. Thus, we can state that Orbán and Fidesz took the wind out of Jobbik's sails and snatched all the important buzzwords (combined with a political trust in a governing position), which earlier characterized rather Jobbik voters and sympathizers.



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